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Abstract
I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and
two senders with common private information and opposed interests. Senders can
misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The
main results concern the amount of information that is transmitted in equilibrium
and the language used by senders to convey such information. Fully revealing and
pure strategy equilibria exist but are not plausible. I identify sufficient conditions
under which equilibria always exist, are plausible, and essentially unique, and deliver
a complete characterization of such equilibria. As an application, I study the
informative value of different judicial procedures.
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1 Introduction
How and how much information is revealed when two equally informed senders with
conflicting interests provide advice to a decision maker? When senders are well informed
and misreporting is prohibitively expensive, the decision maker can “rely on the information
of the interested parties” to always make the right choice.1 However, there are many
situations where information is not fully verifiable and it is possible to misreport it at a
reasonable cost.2 Intuition would suggest that, in these cases, the decision maker might
obtain conflicting advice and make wrong choices as a result of being poorly informed.
On the applied front, this type of interaction is at the core of a large number of
applications: during electoral campaigns, candidates competing for consensus provide
voters with different accounts of the same facts; newspapers with opposed political leanings
deliver conflicting and inaccurate news; prosecutors and defendants may tamper with
evidence to persuade a jury; co-workers competing for a promotion may exaggerate their
own contribution to a team project; advocacy groups use amicus curiae briefs to influence
court cases, and methods used in lobbying against public health include “industry-funded
research that confuses the evidence and keeps the public in doubt” (Chan, 2013).
I address the above questions with a costly signaling game between an uninformed
decision maker and two senders with common information and conflicting goals. The two
senders observe the realization of a random variable—the state—and then simultaneously
or privately deliver a report to the decision maker. These reports are literal statements
about the realized state. Senders can misreport such information, but to do so they incur
“misreporting costs” that are increasing with the magnitude of misrepresentation. By
contrast, reporting truthfully is costless. After observing the reports, the decision maker
must select one of two alternatives, and each player obtains a payoff from the selected
alternative that depends on the state. Every player finds the relative value of the two
alternatives to be increasing with the state.3
Throughout the paper, I restrict attention to equilibria where the decision maker’s
posterior beliefs satisfy a first-order stochastic dominance condition with respect to the
senders’ reports. Under this restriction, reports claiming that the state takes strictly higher
values cannot signal to the decision maker that the relative value of the two alternatives is
strictly lower. This condition is natural given the type of strategic interaction considered
here, where senders have opposed goals, reports are literal, and misreporting is costly.
It imposes some sort of monotonicity over the senders’ reporting strategies, and thus it
1See, e.g., P. Milgrom and Roberts (1986b).
2Misreporting information is a costly activity due to, e.g., the time and effort that is required to
misrepresent information, or because misreporting generates an expected loss in reputation, credibility,
and future influence. Misreporting is more difficult, and thus more costly, when information is harder.
3The state is a valence or vertical differentiation parameter, and can be thought of representing the
relative quality of the two alternatives. Examples are leadership or competence in politicians, durability
or product quality of commercial goods, and fit with the state of the word of policies.
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is akin to restrictions that are widely used in many economic applications, such as in
auction theory and in models of communication with lying costs.
The main results of this paper concern the amount of information that can be plausibly
transmitted in equilibrium and the “language” used by senders to deliver such information.
I first show that misreporting occurs in every equilibrium. Yet, there are “receiver-efficient”
equilibria where the decision maker obtains enough information to always select her
preferred alternative as if fully informed. In spite of senders’ misreporting behavior, the
decision maker might even end up obtaining more information than what she needs. All
these equilibria, while important for this analysis, turn out to be unreasonable.
I show that all receiver-efficient and fully revealing equilibria rely on an ad-hoc choice
of beliefs that have implausible discontinuities to discourage deviations. I identify two
well-known refinements that eliminate such equilibria: unprejudiced beliefs (Bagwell &
Ramey, 1991) and ε-robsutness (Battaglini, 2002).4 A similar fate is met by pure strategy
equilibria, as I show that they are all receiver-efficient and thus unreasonable. This result
motivates the search for mixed strategy equilibria that are robust to such refinements.
The analysis of equilibria in mixed strategies is, however, a daunting task: a notorious
problem of signaling games is that they typically yield a wealth of equilibria, and here this
issue is exacerbated by the presence of multiple senders and of rich state and signal spaces.
Canonical refinements based on the notion of strategic stability (Kohlberg & Mertens,
1986) are of little help, as they are developed for settings with a single sender. I thus
proceed by drawing on the implausibility of receiver-efficient and pure strategy equilibria
to introduce reasonable restrictions on the decision maker’s posterior beliefs.
More specifically, I focus the subsequent analysis on equilibria that satisfy two addi-
tional conditions on the posterior beliefs of the decision maker: the first one is a strong
form of first-order stochastic dominance which requires that conflicting reports claiming
a strictly higher state must signal that the relative value of the two alternatives is, in
expectation, strictly higher; the second is a dominance condition under which the decision
maker excludes the possibility that senders may deliver reports that are equilibrium
dominated.5 I refer to equilibria satisfying these two conditions as “direct equilibria,” as
they feature reports which are direct signals of the realized state.
I provide a complete characterization of direct equilibria, and show that they possess
desirable properties: they always exists, they are essentially unique, and they survive the
refinement criteria that break down fully revealing, receiver-efficient, and pure strategy
equilibria. The two conditions imposed by direct equilibria, even though relatively natural
and mild, are therefore sufficient to ensure robustness and uniqueness while preserving
existence.
4See Section 4 for a formal definition of unprejudiced beliefs and ε-robustness. I show that these two
refinements are tightly connected: equilibria that are ε-robust must have unprejudiced beliefs (Lemma 3).
This result suggests a novel rationale for the use of ε-robustness in multi-sender communication games.
5See Definition 4 in Section 5 for a complete and formal statement of these two conditions.
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In direct equilibria, the transmission of information is qualitatively different than
in comparable models of strategic communication. There is neither “babbling” nor full
revelation, in contrast with predictions advanced by related models of cheap talk and
verifiable disclosure, respectively. By contrast, “revelation” is a probabilistic phenomenon
in the sense that the decision maker fully learns almost every state with some positive
probability. Full revelation is more likely to occur in extreme states, while it is relatively
unlikely in intermediate states. There are extreme states in which both senders always
truthfully reveal the state to the decision maker even though they have opposed goals.
Senders’ equilibrium behavior is mixed, as they always report the truth with some
positive probability, and they misreport otherwise. Therefore, in (almost) every state the
two senders may deliver exactly the same truthful report even though they have conflicting
interests. They might also end up delivering different reports that however imply the
same recommended action to the decision maker. Whenever one of these two events takes
place, the decision maker fully learns the realized state. In the former case full revelation
occurs without wasteful signaling expenditures, while the latter case requires a sender to
engage in costly misreporting. This is in contrast with previous results in multi-sender
signaling games, where full revelation is either always inefficient (Emons & Fluet, 2009)
or it is always efficient (Bagwell & Ramey, 1991).6
Conditional on misreporting, senders deliver reports in a convex set, and no particular
misrepresentation in such set is delivered with strictly positive probability. The misreport-
ing behavior of each sender is directly determined by the feature of its opponent, such as
the opponent’s costs structure and payoff function, and it is determined only indirectly by
its own features. Upon observing two conflicting reports recommending different actions,
the decision maker understands that “the truth is somewhere in between” and that at
least one of the two senders is misreporting. The decision maker cross-validates reports
and allocates the burden of proof across senders by accounting for their characteristics.
The setting studied in the main part of the paper allows for a large number of
asymmetries. I also analyze the specific case where senders have a similar payoff and
cost structure, and where the distribution of the state is such that no sender is ex-
ante advantaged in any way. In this “symmetric environment,” I provide a closed-form
solution to direct equilibria and show that they naturally display symmetric strategies.
The decision maker equally allocates the burden of proof among senders by following
the recommendation of the sender delivering the most extreme report.7 The senders’
misreporting behavior depends on the shape of the common cost function: with convex
costs, senders are more likely to deliver large misrepresentations of the state rather than
6Signaling games with a single sender typically have inefficient separating equailibria. See for example
Spence (1973), P. Milgrom and Roberts (1982, 1986a), Kartik (2009), Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani
(2007).
7This result is reminiscent of equilibria in the all-pay auction with complete information, where the
prize is assigned to the player submitting the highest bid (Baye, Kovenock, & De Vries, 1996).
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small lies, while the opposite is true for concave misreporting costs.
As a brief application, I use insights from the analysis of direct equilibria to study the
informational value of different judicial systems. Shin (1998) shows that, when information
is fully verifiable, the adversarial judicial procedure is always superior to the inquisitorial
procedure. However, Shin (1998) also conjectures that such sharp result may crucially
depend on the assumption of verifiability. I show that, when information is not fully
verifiable, then the inquisitorial procedure may indeed be superior than the adversarial
procedure, thus proving the above conjecture to be correct.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model, which I solve in Section 4 and 5. In Section 6,
I provide an example and an application. Finally, Section 7 concludes. Formal proofs are
relegated to Appendix A.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to different strands of literature. First, it relates to models of
strategic communication with multiple senders. This line of work shows several channels
through which full information revelation can be obtained (Battaglini, 2002; Krishna &
Morgan, 2001; P. Milgrom & Roberts, 1986b). Papers in this literature typically assume
that misreporting is either costless (cheap talk) or impossible (verifiable disclosure). By
contrast, in this article misreporting is possible at a cost that depends on the magnitude
of misrepresentation. Under this modelling specification, I show that fully revealing
equilibria exist but are not plausible.
Therefore, this paper relates to models of strategic communication with misreporting
costs (Chen, 2011; Chen, Kartik, & Sobel, 2008; Kartik, 2009; Kartik et al., 2007; Ottaviani
& Squintani, 2006). All these papers are concerned with the single-sender case, while I
consider a multi-sender setting. An exception is Dziuda and Salas (2018), where they
study a communication game with endogenous lying costs and consider a case with two
senders.
The introduction of misreporting costs makes this a costly signaling model. Therefore,
this paper contributes to the literature of multi-sender signaling with perfectly correlated
types, but it differs from this line of work in a number of ways. First, in my model the
messages or signals of senders have the only role of transmitting information, and thus do
not directly affect how players value each alternative. This is not the case, e.g., in related
models of limit entry (Bagwell & Ramey, 1991; Schultz, 1996), price competition (Bester
& Demuth, 2015; Fluet & Garella, 2002; Hertzendorf & Overgaard, 2001; Yehezkel, 2008),
and public good provision (Schultz, 1996).8 Second, I model a setting where the signals of
8For example, in these models firms may signal quality through prices, which affect market demand
and thus profits. Some of these papers also study signaling by both pricing and advertising together.
6
senders are fully observable.9 By contrast, in the entry deterrence models of Harrington
(1987) and Orzach and Tauman (1996), incumbent firms simultaneously select their own
pre-entry output, but the entrant can observe only the resulting market price.
A key feature of the model analyzed in this paper is that both senders pay their
own signaling costs independently of the decision maker’s choice. This all-pay feature is
missing in related multi-sender signaling models of electoral competition (Banks, 1990;
Callander & Wilkie, 2007), where only the elected candidate incurs the signaling cost.10
The type of strategic interaction and competition that is analyzed in this article is
reminiscent of and closely related to all-pay contest models, where contestants compete
for a prize by simultaneously delivering costly scores or bids (Baye et al., 1996; Siegel,
2009). In these papers, the mapping from signals or scores to outcomes is exogenously
determined by a contest success function. For example, Skaperdas and Vaidya (2012)
study persuasion by contending parties as an all-pay contest. The paper studied here
differs from this literature in that the decision maker is a strategic actor whose choice
is endogenously determined as a part of an equilibrium. Similarly, Gul and Pesendorfer
(2012) study political contests were two parties with opposing interests provide costly
payoff-relevant signals to a strategic voter. However, in their model only one party incurs
a cost at each moment, and parties cannot distort information.
Finally, this paper is also connected to work studying adversarial procedures (De-
watripont & Tirole, 1999; Shin, 1998). Differently than this line of work, I consider a
model where information is not fully verifiable. In this regard, Emons and Fluet (2009)
constitute an exception. However, they consider a setting with a continuum of types,
signals, and receiver’s actions, which yields only fully revealing equilibria.
3 The Model
Set-up and timeline. There are three players: two informed senders (1 and 2) and one
uninformed decision maker (dm). Let θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R be the underlying state, distributed
according to the full support probability density function f . After observing the realized
state θ, each of the two senders simultaneously or privately deliver to the decision maker
a report rj ∈ Rj, where rj is a report by sender j and Rj is the report space of sender j.
The decision maker, after observing the pair of reports (r1, r2) but not the state θ, selects
an alternative a ∈ {+©, -©}.
Payoffs. Player i ∈ {1, 2, dm} obtains a payoff of ui(a, θ) if the decision maker selects
9Signals are not fully observable if, e.g., they are aggregated into a single score and the receiver can
observe only such score, but cannot observe each individual signal.
10These papers also differs from my model in that they consider settings where senders do not have
common information. Similarly, Mailath (1989) and Daughety and Reinganum (2007) study price signaling
and Honryo (2018) studies risk shifts in settings with imperfectly correlated types. My model should be
seen as complementary to this line of work.
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alternative a in state θ. I normalize ui ( -©, θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ and denote by ui(θ) ≡
ui(+©, θ), where ui(θ) is weakly increasing in θ. The decision maker’s expected utility from
selecting +© given the senders’ reports is Udm(r1, r2). Thus, the state θ is an element of
vertical differentiation or valence component over which players share a common preference,
and it is interpreted as the relative quality of alternative +© with respect to alternative -©.
I may refer to the state θ also as the senders’ “type.”
Misreporting costs. Sender j bears a cost kjCj(rj, θ) for delivering report rj when the
state is θ. The cost function Cj(rj, θ) ≥ 0 is continuous and such that, for every θ ∈ Θ
and j ∈ {1, 2}, we have that Cj(θ, θ) = 0 and
if rj ≷ θ, then
dCj(rj, θ)
drj
≷ 0 ≷
dCj(rj, θ)
dθ
.
The scalar kj > 0 is a finite parameter measuring the intensity of misreporting costs.
Therefore, misreporting is increasingly costly with the magnitude of misrepresentation,
while truthful reporting is always costless. Sender j’s total utility is
wj(rj, θ, a) = 1{a = +©}uj(θ) − kjCj(rj, θ),
where 1{·} is the indicator function. It follows that, conditional on the decision maker’s
eventual choice, both senders prefer to deliver reports that are closer to the truth.
Definitions and assumptions. I assume that the state space and the report spaces
are the same, i.e., R1 = R2 = Θ. Thus, a generic report r has the literal or exogenous
meaning “The state is θ = r.” I say that sender j reports truthfully when rj = θ, and
misreports otherwise. I sometimes use −j to denote the sender other than sender j.
I define the “threshold” τi as the state in which player i is indifferent between the two
alternatives. Formally, τi := {θ ∈ Θ|ui(θ) = 0}. I assume that utilities ui(θ) are such that
τi exists and is unique
11 for every i ∈ {1, 2, dm}. The threshold τi tells us that player i
prefers +© over -© when the state θ is greater than τi. Throughout the paper, I consider
the case where senders have opposing biases, i.e., τ1 < τdm < τ2. To make the problem
non-trivial I let τdm ∈ Θ, and I normalize τdm = 0. Therefore, the decision maker prefers
to select the positive alternative +© when the state θ takes positive values, and prefers
to select the negative alternative -© when the state is negative. I assume that when the
decision maker is indifferent between the two alternatives at given beliefs, she selects +©.
I define the “reach” of sender j in state θ as the report which associated misreporting
costs offset j’s gains from having its own preferred alternative eventually selected. Formally,
11These assumptions are for notational convenience. The model can accommodate for senders that
always strictly prefer one alternative over the other and for utility functions such that ui(θ) 6= 0 for every
θ ∈ Θ, including step utility functions.
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the “upper reach” r̄j(θ) ≥ θ of sender j in state θ is defined as
r̄j(θ) := max
{
r ∈ R | (−1)1{θ<τj}uj (θ) = kjCj (r, θ)
}
. (1)
Similarly, the “lower reach” r
¯
j(θ) ≤ θ of sender j in state θ is defined as
r
¯
j(θ) := min
{
r ∈ R | (−1)1{θ<τj}uj (θ) = kjCj (r, θ)
}
. (2)
I will sometimes use the “inverse reaches” r̄−11 (r1) and r
¯
−1
2 (r2), where r̄
−1
j (·) and r
¯
−1
j (·)
map from Rj to Θ and are defined as the inverse functions of r̄j(θ) and r
¯
j(θ), respectively.
I assume that the state and report spaces are large enough, that is,
Θ ⊇ R̂ := [r
¯
2(0), r̄1(0)] .
This assumption ensures that the information senders can transmit is not artificially
bounded by restrictions in the reports that they can deliver.
Strategies. A pure strategy for sender j is a function ρj : Θ → Rj such that ρj(θ) is
the report delivered by sender j in state θ. A mixed strategy for sender j is a mixed
probability measure φj : Θ → ∆(Rj), where φj(rj, θ) is the mixed probability density that
φj(θ) assigns to a report rj ∈ Rj. I denote by Sj(θ) the support of sender j’s strategy in
state θ. Section 5 introduces additional notation that is required to study equilibria in
mixed strategies.
I say that a pair of reports (r1, r2) is off-path if, given the senders’ strategies, (r1, r2)
will never be observed by the decision maker. Otherwise, I say that the pair (r1, r2) is on-
path. A posterior beliefs function for the decision maker is a mapping p : R1 ×R2 → ∆(Θ)
which, given any pair of reports (r1, r2), generates posterior beliefs p(θ|r1, r2) with CDF
P (θ|r1, r2). Given a pair of reports (r1, r2) and posterior beliefs p(θ|r1, r2), the decision
maker selects an alternative in the sequentially rational set β(r1, r2), where
β(r1, r2) = arg max
a∈{+©, -©}
Ep [udm(a, θ)|r1, r2] .
As mentioned before, if p(θ|r1, r2) is such that Udm(r1, r2) = 0, then β(r1, r2) = +©.
Solution concept. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).12
Throughout the paper, I restrict attention to equilibria where beliefs p satisfy the following
first-order stochastic dominance condition: for every rj ≥ r
′
j and j ∈ {1, 2},
Udm(r1, r2) ≥ Udm(r
′
1, r
′
2). (FOSD)
Condition (FOSD) says that a higher report cannot signal to the decision maker a lower
12For a textbook definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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expected utility from selecting alternative +©.13 A focus on these equilibria is natural
given that the value of +© is increasing in the state, reports are literal, and misreporting is
costly.
Since in equilibrium the decision maker has correct beliefs, imposing conditions on p has
consequences over the senders’ equilibrium reporting behavior. An immediate implication
of (FOSD) is that senders play strategies that satisfy some sort of monotonicity condition:
in every equilibrium, a sender that prefers alternative +© over -© is never going to deliver a
report that is strictly lower than the actual realized value of θ. The next lemma formalizes
this result.
Lemma 1. In every perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying (FOSD), minSj(θ) ≥ θ for
θ ≥ τj and max Sj(θ) ≤ θ otherwise, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 1 shows how (FOSD) is akin to assumptions that are widely used in many
economic applications, such as the monotone bidding strategies in auction theory (e.g.,
Wilson (1977)), the monotone likelihood ratio property in signal distributions (e.g.,
P. R. Milgrom (1981)), and the message monotonicity in related communication games
(e.g., Kartik (2009)). To study mixed strategy equilibria, I will use a stronger version
of (FOSD) coupled with an additional condition that draws on a dominance argument.
Section 5 introduces these conditions together with additional notation that is required
to describe mixed strategies. Hereafter, I refer to perfect Bayesian equilibria that satisfy
(FOSD) simply as “equilibria.”
3.1 Benchmark
Before solving for the equilibria of the model, I briefly consider a number of benchmark
cases that are useful to interpret the results in the next sections.
Full information. Under full information about the state θ, the decision maker selects
+© when θ ≥ 0 and selects -© otherwise. Both senders would always report truthfully. The
ex-ante full information welfare obtained by the decision maker in this scenario is
Wfi =
∫ max Θ
0
f(θ)udm(θ)dθ. (3)
Perfect alignment. Sender j is perfectly aligned with the decision maker when τj = τdm.
There is an equilibrium where the perfectly aligned sender j always reports truthfully
and the decision maker blindly trusts j’s reports. The other sender, even if not perfectly
aligned, can do no better than reporting truthfully as well. In this case, the decision
maker gets her full information welfare Wfi, and no misreporting takes place.
13Posterior beliefs p(θ|r1, r2) first-order stochastically dominate p(θ|r
′
1
, r′
2
) for rj ≥ r
′
j , j ∈ {1, 2}, if and
only if
∫
u(θ)p(θ|r1, r2)dθ ≥
∫
u(θ)p(θ|r′
1
, r′
2
)dθ for every weakly increasing utility function u(θ). Thus,
condition (FOSD) is weaker than that as it needs to apply only to u(θ) ≡ udm(θ).
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Verifiable information. Consider the case where information about the state is fully
verifiable, that is, kj = ∞, j ∈ {1, 2}. Senders cannot profitably withhold information,
but even if they could we would obtain an equilibrium where in every state at least one
of the two senders discloses truthfully (P. Milgrom & Roberts, 1986b).14 As before, the
decision maker gets its full information welfare Wfi.
Cheap talk. Suppose now that k1 = k2 = 0. A babbling equilibrium exists, where
the decision maker adjudicates according to her prior f only, while senders deliver
uninformative messages. There is no equilibrium where the decision maker obtains enough
information to always select her preferred alternative.15 In an informative equilibrium,
the decision maker can only learn that the state is between the senders’ thresholds τj.
Therefore, when misreporting is “cheap,” the decision maker obtains an ex-ante welfare
that is strictly lower than Wfi.
4 Receiver-efficient and Pure Strategy Equilibria
The goal of this section is that of studying the existence and the plausibility of equilibria
where the decision maker always obtains the information she needs to select her preferred
alternative. This class of equilibria is important because it is believed that competition
in “the marketplace of ideas” may result in the truth becoming known (Gentzkow &
Shapiro, 2008). Competing forces may indeed yield full information revelation in cheap
talk settings (Battaglini, 2002) as well as in models of verifiable disclosure (P. Milgrom &
Roberts, 1986b).
In this setting, the combination of a rich state space together with a binary action
space implies that, to select her favorite alternative, the decision maker does not need to
know precisely what is the realized state θ. All the decision maker needs to know is, in
fact, only whether the state is positive or negative. For the purpose of this section, a focus
on fully revealing equilibria would therefore be too restrictive. The following definition
gives a weaker notion of revelation that will provide useful for the analysis that follows.
Definition 1. A “fully revealing equilibrium” (FRE) is an equilibrium where for every
θ′ ∈ Θ, rj ∈ Sj(θ
′), and j ∈ {1, 2}, P (θ|r1, r2) = 1 if and only if θ ≥ θ
′. A “receiver-
efficient equilibrium” (REE) is an equilibrium where for every θ ∈ Θ, rj ∈ Sj(θ), and
j ∈ {1, 2}, β(r1, r2) = +© if θ ≥ 0, and β(r1, r2) = -© otherwise.
14If withholding is not possible or prohibitively expensive, then this result holds even when only one of
the two senders has verifiable information, i.e., 0 ≤ kj < ki = ∞ for i 6= j: in equilibrium, the decision
maker pays attention only to sender i and disregards every report delivered by sender j, which cannot do
better than reporting truthfully as well.
15Battaglini (2002) shows conditions under which there is full revelation of the state in cheap talk
games. With a binary action space the decision maker cannot take extreme actions that punish both
senders, and thus there cannot be equilibria where the state is fully revealed.
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A fully revealing equilibrium is also receiver-efficient, but a receiver-efficient equilibrium
is not necessarily fully revealing. If competing forces could discipline senders into always
report truthfully their private information about the state, then full revelation would
naturally occur. However, the following observation points out that, in the game considered
here and described in Section 3, misreporting occurs in every equilibrium.
Observation 1. Misreporting occurs in every equilibrium.
To see why, suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an equilibrium16 where
misreporting never occurs, that is, where ρ1(θ) = ρ2(θ) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ. Consider
such a truthful equilibrium and a state θ = ǫ > 0, where ǫ is small enough. To discourage
deviations, off-path beliefs must be such that β(ǫ,−ǫ) = +©. However, there always exists
an ǫ > 0 such that, when the state is θ = −ǫ, sender 1 can profitably deviate from the
prescribed truthful strategy by reporting r1 = ǫ, as u1(−ǫ) > k1C1(ǫ,−ǫ). This contradicts
the existence of equilibria where misreporting never occurs.
The question is: if senders misreport in every equilibrium, do receiver-efficient equilibria
exist at all? Figure 1 provides a positive graphical answer by showing reporting strategies
that not only constitute a receiver-efficent equilibrium, but are also fully revealing.17
To verify that Figure 1 depicts an equilibrium, consider the following strategies: sender
1 delivers ρ1(θ) = r̄1(0) for every θ ∈ [0, r̄1(0)], where for simplicity we assume that
r̄1(0) < τ2. Otherwise, sender 1 reports truthfully. By contrast, sender 2 always report
truthfully, i.e., ρ2(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ. Given any on-path pair of reports, posterior beliefs
are such that P (θ|r1, r2) = 0 for every θ < r2 and P (θ|r1, r2) = 1 otherwise, which is
consistent with sender 2 playing a separating strategy. Off-path beliefs are such that such
that Udm(r1, r2) < 0 if r1 < r̄1(0), and P (θ|r1, r2) = 1 if and only if θ ≥ r1 ≥ r̄1(0). By
definition of reach, sender 1 would never find it profitable to deliver a report r1 ≥ r̄1(0)
when θ < 0. Sender 2 cannot deviate from its truthful strategy by delivering a negative
report when the state is positive: since ρ1(θ) ≥ r̄1(0) for every θ ≥ 0, such a deviation
would induce β(·) = +©. No sender has a profitable individual deviation from the prescribed
equilibrium strategies. Therefore, there exist equilibria where senders always fully reveal
the state to the decision maker, even though full revelation involves misreporting.
Incidentally, Figure 1 also proves the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. In-
tuitively, when two competing senders with opposed interests play pure strategies, the
decision maker can “undo” their reports to recover the underlying truth. This argument
may suggest that all pure strategy equilibria are receiver-efficient. The next lemma shows
that such intuition is correct and, in addition, that all receiver-efficient equilibria are in
pure strategies.
16Observation 1 applies to every perfect Bayesian equilibria, and not only to those satisfying (FOSD).
17In a single-sender setting with unbounded state space, Kartik et al. (2007) study a fully revealing
equilibrium where misreporting occurs in every state. There, the reporting strategy is fully separating.
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θ
ρj(θ)
τ1 0 τ2
r̄1(0)
Figure 1: Senders’ strategies in a receiver-efficient and fully revealing equilibrium. The
reporting rules of sender 1 and 2 are in black and dashed gray, respectively.
Lemma 2. An equilibrium is receiver-efficient if and only if it is in pure strategies.
The receiver-efficient and fully revealing equilibrium strategies discussed above are,
however, problematic. To see what the problem is, consider again the strategies pictured
in Figure 1 and a state θ′ ∈ (0, r̄1(0)). Suppose that in state θ
′ sender 1 deviates from the
prescribed equilibrium by reporting the truth instead of ρ1(θ
′) = r̄1(0), whereas sender 2
sticks to its separating reporting rule. Notice that, in the equilibrium under consideration,
sender 1 never delivers r1 = θ
′. Upon observing the off-path pair of reports (θ′, θ′), beliefs
p induce an expected payoff of Udm(θ
′, θ′) < 0 and lead to β(θ′, θ′) = -©. These off-path
beliefs require the decision maker to conjecture that the state is likely to be negative.
However, this means that the decision maker must entertain the possibility that (i) both
senders performed at the same time a deviation from the prescribed equilibrium strategies,
and that (ii) sender 2 has delivered a strictly dominated report.
In addition, the receiver-efficient equilibrium in Figure 1 is sustained by beliefs that
are discontinuous: for every on-path pair of reports (r̄1(0), r2) such that r2 ∈ (0, r̄1(0)),
beliefs are such that Udm(r̄1(0), r2) = udm(r2) > 0; by contrast, Udm(r̄1(0) − ǫ, r2) < 0 for
every arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. This discontinuity is crucial to discourage deviations, but it
does not seem plausible especially when considering its problematic implications discussed
above. In the remaining part of this section, I put receiver-efficient equilibria under the
scrutiny of two well-known tests for games with multiple senders: unprejudiced beliefs
(Bagwell & Ramey, 1991) and ε-robustness (Battaglini, 2002).
Unprejudiced beliefs. Consider again a deviation from the equilibrium depicted in
Figure 1 where both senders report truthfully in some state θ′ ∈ (0, r̄1(0)). If, whenever
possible, the decision maker conjectures deviations as individual and thus as originating
from one sender only, then she should infer that sender 1 has performed the deviation:
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sender 1 never delivers r1 = θ
′ on the equilibrium path, whereas sender 2 truthfully
reports r2 = θ
′ only when the state is indeed θ′. Since sender 2 is following its separating
strategy, the decision maker should infer that the state is θ′ > 0. According to this line of
reasoning, off-path beliefs must be such that P (θ|θ′, θ′) = 1 if and only if θ ≥ θ′, and thus
β(θ′, θ′) = +©. Therefore, such a deviation becomes profitable for sender 1 because it saves
on misreporting costs without affecting the outcome.
Bagwell and Ramey (1991) introduce the concept of “unprejudiced beliefs,” which
formalize the idea that the decision maker should exclude the possibility that multiple
senders are deviating at the same time whenever it is possible that only a single sender is
deviating. Vida and Honryo (2019) show that, in generic multi-sender signaling games,
strategic stability (Kohlberg & Mertens, 1986) implies unprejudiced beliefs. Apart for its
relationship with the notion of strategic stability, unprejudiced beliefs are intuitive, easily
applicable, and consistent with the notion of Nash equilibrium, and therefore constitute a
sensible way to refine equilibria in multi-sender signaling games where other criteria fail
to do so. The following definition formalizes unprejudiced beliefs.18
Definition 2 (Vida & Honryo, 2019). Given senders’ strategies ρj, beliefs p are unprej-
udiced if, for every pair of reports (r1, r2) such that ρj(θ
′) = rj for some θ
′ ∈ Θ and
j ∈ {1, 2}, we have that p(θ′′|r1, r2) > 0 only if there is a sender i ∈ {1, 2} such that
ρi(θ
′′) = ri.
We have seen how the above “informational free-riding” argument breaks down the
receiver-efficient equilibrium depicted in Figure 1. A natural question is whether such
argument applies only in that particular case or if instead it prunes out other equilibria.
The next proposition tells us that in fact there is no receiver-efficient equilibrium that
supports unprejudiced beliefs.
Proposition 1. There are no receiver-efficient equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs.
ε-robustness. In the model described in Section 3, senders are perfectly informed and
the receiver can perfectly observe the senders’ reports. There is no “noise” or perturbation
in what senders report or in what the decision maker observes. This modelling strategy
allows me to isolate the effects of strategic interactions and inference from the effects
of statistical information aggregation. However, this procedure may give us excessive
freedom to pick ad-hoc beliefs that would not survive the presence of even arbitrarily
small perturbations in the transmission of information.
I follow Battaglini (2002) and define an ε-perturbed game as the game described in
Section 3 in which the decision maker perfectly observes the report of sender j with
probability 1 − εj and with probability εj observes a random report r̃j, where r̃j is a
18Definition 2 is weaker than the definition originally introduced by Bagwell and Ramey (1991), and
therefore it is useful to test for equilibria that do not support unprejudiced beliefs.
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random variable with continuous distribution Gj, density gj, and support in Θ. This may
correspond to a situation where with some probability the decision maker misreads reports;
or, alternatively, where with some probability senders commit mistakes in delivering their
reports.19 As before, senders incur misreporting costs that depend only on the realized
state θ and on their “intended” report rj, but not on the wrongly observed or delivered
r̃j. The introduction of noise makes any pair of reports to be possible on the equilibrium
path. The decision maker’s posterior beliefs depend on ε = (ε1, ε2), G = (G1, G2), and on
the senders’ reporting strategies ρj(θ).
Definition 3 (Battaglini (2002)). An equilibrium is ε-robust if there exists a pair of
distributions G = (G1, G2) and a sequence ε
n = (εn1 , ε
n
2 ) converging to zero such that the
off-path beliefs of the equilibrium are the limit as εn → 0+ of the beliefs that the equilibrium
strategies would induce in an ε-perturbed game.
Intuitively, as the noise ε fades away, the event in which the decision maker misreads
both reports becomes negligible. At the limit as ε → 0+, the decision maker infers that
she is correctly observing at least one of the two reports. Therefore, upon observing an
off-path pair of reports, beliefs in an ε-robust equilibrium are as if the decision maker
conjectures—whenever possible—that one sender is following its prescribed reporting
strategy while the other is not. This conclusion is reminiscent of unprejudiced beliefs,
and suggests that there might be a tight connection between these two refinement criteria.
The next lemma confirms the existence of such a relationship.
Lemma 3. If a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is ε-robust, then it has unprejudiced beliefs.
A straight forward implication of Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 is that no receiver-
efficient or fully revealing equilibrium is ε-robust. By Lemma 2, we obtain that also pure
strategy equilibria do not have unprejudiced beliefs and are not ε-robust. These results
suggest that mixed strategy equilibria are qualitatively important, whereas in related
work pure strategies have a prominent role.20 The next section is dedicated to finding
equilibria that are robust in the sense that are ε-robust, and supported by unprejudiced
beliefs.
19Battaglini (2002) introduces noise in what senders know, while here I perturb the reports observed
by the decision maker. This type of perturbation is qualitatively equivalent to that used by Battaglini
(2002).
20For example, Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) focus on pure strategy only, and in Chen (2011)
there are no (monotone) mixed strategies. Most work on multi-sender signaling (see Section 2) also study
only pure strategy equilibria. Results in Section 4 also suggest that the similarity between this setting
and contest theory goes beyond the type of strategic interaction between senders, but it extends also to
the equilibrium behavior, which, in contests, is typically in mixed strategies (Siegel, 2009).
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5 Direct Equilibria
Findings in the previous section show that pure strategy equilibria exist and are receiver-
efficient, but are supported by an unreasonable choice of off-path beliefs. Such results
motivate the quest for “robust” equilibria which, if exist, must therefore be in mixed
strategies. The two main goals of this section are that of providing sufficient conditions
under which equilibria are robust and to characterize such robust equilibria.
Since (FOSD) is not enough to rule out unreasonable equilibria, I need to impose a
different set of restrictions to study robust mixed strategy equilibria. However, classical
refinements for signaling games such as the “intuitive criterion” (Cho & Kreps, 1987) and
the “universal divinity” (Banks & Sobel, 1987) have little bite here, as they are developed
for single-sender settings. To date, there is no large consensus on how to extend these
criteria to multi-sender settings. By contrast, ε-robustness and unprejudiced beliefs proved
to be useful in testing separating equilibria of multi-sender signaling games, but cannot
be easily applied when looking for non-separating equilibria in mixed strategies.
Therefore, I draw on the implausibility of receiver-efficient equilibria to impose two
conditions on how the decision maker interprets the senders’ reports. I refer to equilibria
satisfying these conditions as “direct equilibria.”
Definition 4. A “direct equilibrium” (DE) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where poste-
rior beliefs p satisfy the following conditions:
i) condition (FOSD) holds, and for every pair of reports (r1, r2) such that r
¯
2(0) < r2 ≤
0 ≤ r1 < r̄1(0), and for j ∈ {1, 2},
dUdm(r1, r2)
drj
> 0; (D)
ii) upon observing the pairs of reports (r̄1(0), r
¯
2(0)) and (0, 0), beliefs p are such that
the decision maker is indifferent between the two alternatives, that is,
Udm (r̄1(0), r
¯
2(0)) = Udm (0, 0) = 0. (C)
The first condition, (D), imposes a “strict” first-order stochastic dominance on posterior
beliefs p, but only for pairs of reports consisting of conflicting recommendations. Otherwise,
(FOSD) applies. Since (D) implies (FOSD), Lemma 1 applies also to direct equilibria.
Intuitively, (D) means that strictly higher conflicting reports inform the decision maker
that the expected value of selecting alternative +© is strictly higher. As for (FOSD), this
condition is natural and consistent with the idea that reports are literal statements about
the state and that misreporting is costly.
Condition (C) draws from a simple argument of equilibrium dominance. To see why,
consider a report rj ∈ R̂, and define by Qj(rj) the set of states for which delivering report
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rj is potentially profitable for sender j given that beliefs p satisfy (D). By Lemma 1 and
the definition of inverse reach, we obtain that Q1(r1) = [r̄
−1
1 (r1), r1] ∩ Θ and Q2(r2) =
[r2, r
¯
−1
2 (r2)] ∩ Θ. Denote the intersection of these two sets by Q(r1, r2) = Q1(r1) ∩Q2(r2).
If Q(r1, r2) 6= ∅, then it would be sensible for the decision maker to exclude the possibility
that the realized state lies outside Q(r1, r2), i.e., p(θ|r1, r2) = 0 for all θ /∈ Q(r1, r2). Since
Q(r̄1(0), r
¯
2(0)) = Q(0, 0) = {0}, upon receiving the pairs or reports (r̄1(0), r
¯
2(0)) or (0, 0),
the decision maker should understand that the realized state21 is for sure θ = 0. Otherwise,
the decision maker would have to believe that at least one of the two senders has delivered
a report that is equilibrium dominated. Condition (C) is even less stringent than this
argument suggests, as it does not require beliefs to be degenerate at 0, and does not
impose conditions over pairs of reports22 other than (r̄1(0), r
¯
2(0)) and (0, 0).
As an immediate application of direct equilibria, reconsider the fully revealing and
voter-efficient equilibrium in Figure 1 previously discussed in Section 4. To prevent a
deviation by sender 1, beliefs p are such that Udm(θ
′, θ′) < 0 for any θ′ ∈ (0, r̄1(0)), and
thus β(θ′, θ′) = -©. That cannot be a direct equilibrium: by (C) we have that Udm(0, 0) = 0,
and by (D) it must be that Udm(θ
′, θ′) ≥ 0, leading to β(θ′, θ′) = +© and thus to a profitable
deviation by sender 1. Therefore, conditions (C) and (D) rule out at least some equilibria
that, we have seen, are not plausible.
By the end of this section we will see that direct equilibria have a number of remarkable
properties: they always exists, they are essentially unique, and there are direct equilibria
that are ε-robust and thus with unprejudiced beliefs.
5.1 Notation for Mixed Strategies
Before analyzing direct equilibria, I first introduce further notation. To describe mixed
strategies, I use a “mixed” probability distribution φj(rj, θ) which, for every state θ,
assigns a mixed probability density to report rj by sender j. This specification allows me
to describe the senders’ reporting strategies as mixed random variables which distribution
can be partly continuous and partly discrete.23
Formally, I partition the support Sj(θ) of each sender in two subsets, Cj(θ) and Dj(θ).
To represent atoms in φj(θ), I define a partial probability density function αj(·, θ) on Dj(θ)
such that 0 ≤ αj(rj, θ) ≤ 1 for all rj ∈ Dj(θ), and α̂j(θ) =
∑
rj∈Dj(θ) αj(rj, θ). By contrast,
the continuous part of the distribution φj(θ) is described by a partial probability density
function ψj(·, θ) on Cj(θ) such that
∫
rj∈Cj(θ)
ψj(rj, θ)dθ = 1 − α̂j(θ). I set αj(r
′, θ) = 0 for
21From P (θ|r̄1(0), r
¯2
(0)) = P (θ|0, 0) = 1 iff θ ≥ 0 we get Udm (r̄1(0), r
¯2
(0)) = Udm (0, 0) = udm(0) = 0.
22As we shall see, it turns out that in every direct equilibrium the pair (r̄1(0), r
¯2
(0)) is on-path only for
θ = 0, and thus it fully reveals that the state is indeed zero. By contrast, no sender ever delivers rj = 0,
and thus the pair of reports (0, 0) is not only off-path, but it must constitute a double deviation.
23Mixed type distributions that have both a continuous and a discrete component to their probability
distributions are widely used to model zero-inflated data such as queuing times. For example, the “rectified
gaussian” is a mixed discrete-continuous distribution.
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all r′ /∈ Dj(θ) and ψj(r
′′, θ) = 0 for all r′′ /∈ Cj(θ).
As we shall see (Lemma 7 and Proposition 4), in every direct equilibrium Dj(θ) = {θ}
for all θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, I hereafter simplify notation by setting αj(θ) ≡
αj(θ, θ) = α̂j(θ). The score αj(θ) thus represents the probability that sender j reports
truthfully in state θ ∈ Θ. The partial density probabilities24 αj(θ) and ψj(·, θ) determine
the “generalized” density function φj(θ) through the well defined mixed distribution
φj(x, θ) = δ(x− θ)αj(θ) + ψj(x, θ),
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta “generalized” function.25
A mixed strategy for sender j is a mixed probability measure φj(θ) : Θ → ∆(Rj) with
support Sj(θ). I indicate with φj(rj, θ) the mixed probability assigned by φj(θ) to a report
rj in state θ that satisfies
∫
rj∈Sj(θ)
φj(rj, θ)drj = αj(θ) +
∫
rj∈Cj(θ)
ψj(rj, θ)drj = 1.
I denote by Φj(rj, θ) and Ψj(rj, θ) the CDFs of φj and ψj, respectively. Sender j’s expected
utility from delivering rj when the state is θ in a direct equilibrium ω is W
ω
j (rj, θ).
5.2 Solving for Direct Equilibria
In the remaining parts of this section, I characterize direct equilibria and show their
properties. All proofs and a number of intermediate results are relegated to Appendix A.2.
Given a pair of reports (r1, r2) the decision maker forms posterior beliefs p(θ|r1, r2),
which determine whether she rationally selects +© or -©. Consider a direct equilibrium and
a pair of reports (r1, r2) such that r2 < 0 and Udm(r1, r2) < 0, and suppose that there
exists a report r′1 ∈ R1 such that Udm(r
′
1, r2) > 0. By conditions (C) and (D), it must be
26
that there exists a report r′′1 ∈ (r1, r
′
1) such that Udm(r
′′
1 , r2) = 0. In this case, r
′′
1 “swings”
the decision maker’s choice as β(r, r2) = +© for all r ≥ r
′′
1 and β(r, r2) = -© otherwise, and
I say that r′′1 is the “swing report” of r2. The notion of swing report is key for the analysis
of direct equilibria, and the following definition formalizes this concept.
Definition 5. Given a report r, I define the “swing report” s(r) as
s(r) =



{r2 ∈ R2 | Udm(r, r2) = 0} if r ≥ 0
{r1 ∈ R1 | Udm(r1, r) = 0} otherwise.
24Under this specification, even the “mass” αj(·) is a partial probability “density.”
25The Dirac delta δ(x) is a generalized function such that δ(x) = 0 for all x 6= 0, δ(0) = ∞ and
∫ ǫ
−ǫ
δ(x)dx = 1 for any ǫ > 0.
26By (C) we have Udm(0, 0) = 0, and by (D) we have Udm(0, r2) < 0 and r
′
1
> r1. Since the
differentiability of Udm for conflicting reports implies its continuity, and since Udm(r
′
1
, r2) > 0, it follows
from the intermediate value theorem that there must be a r′′
1
∈ (0, r′
1
) such that Udm(r
′′
1
, r2) = 0.
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If s(r) = ∅, then I set s(r) = −∞ for r ≥ 0, and s(r) = ∞ otherwise.
With some abuse of language, I hereafter say that sender j “swings” the report of
its opponent −j whenever the pair of reports (r1, r2) induce the selection of sender j’s
preferred alternative. When there is a conflict of interests between senders, that is for
some θ ∈ (τ1, τ2), sender 1 swings the report of sender 2 whenever r1 ≥ s(r2). Similarly,
sender 2 swings the report of sender 1 when r2 < s(r1).
In a direct equilibrium, the swing report s(r) has a number of intuitive properties: first,
condition (D) ensures that the swing report, if it exists, is unique; second, condition (C)
pins down the swing report for s(r̄1(0)) = r
¯
2(0), s(r
¯
2(0)) = r̄1(0), and s(0) = 0. From the
interaction of conditions (C) and (D), it follows that every report r ∈ R̂ = [r
¯
2(0), r̄1(0)]
has a unique swing report s(r) ∈ R̂ such that if r > 0 then s(r) < 0. Moreover, for
all r ∈ R̂, the swing report of a swing report is the report itself, i.e., s(s(r)) = r, and
strictly higher reports have strictly lower swing reports. Importantly, s(r) is endogenously
determined in equilibrium through the posterior beliefs p. The following lemma formalizes
these equilibrium features of the swing report function.
Lemma 4. In a direct equilibrium, every report r ∈ R̂ has a swing report s(r) ∈ R̂ such
that (i) if r ≷ 0 then s(r) ≶ 0 and s(0) = 0; (ii) s(s(r)) = r; (iii) for every r ∈ R̂,
ds(r)
dr
< 0; (iv) s (r̄1(0)) = r
¯
2(0).
Therefore, s(r) is effectively a strictly decreasing function of r in the set [r
¯
2(0), r̄1(0)],
and in such domain I refer to s(r) as the “swing report function.” When the state takes
extreme values, a sender may not be able to profitably swing the report of its opponent
even when the opponent reports truthfully. This happens when s(θ) is beyond a sender’s
reach. In such cases, we should expect both senders to always report truthfully, and thus
to deliver congruent reports that reveal the state. It is therefore useful to define cutoffs
in the state space that help determine when truthful reporting always occurs in direct
equilibria.
Definition 6. The “truthful cutoffs” are defined as
θ1 := {θ ∈ Θ | s(θ) = r̄1(θ)} ,
θ2 := {θ ∈ Θ | s(θ) = r
¯
2(θ)} .
The truthful cutoffs are also determined in equilibrium, as they depend on s(r). Recall
that by condition (C) we have that s(r
¯
2(0)) = r̄1(0) and s(0) = 0. Since r̄1(θ) is increasing
in θ and r̄1(τ1) = τ1 < 0 < s(τ1), it follows that 0 > θ1 > max{τ1, r
¯
2(0)}. Similarly,
we obtain that 0 < θ2 < min{τ2, r̄1(0)}. Therefore, in any direct equilibrium the set
of states that lie within the truthful cutoffs (θ1, θ2) is also a strict subset of [τ1, τ2] and
of [r
¯
2(0), r̄1(0)]. This equilibrium feature of the truthful cutoffs is convenient because
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it implies that for every state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) there is always a conflict of interest between
senders, and that the swing report function s(θ) exists and is well defined in such a set.27
In a direct equilibrium, we should expect both senders to always report truthfully—and
thus to play pure strategies—whenever the state lies outside the truthful cutoffs. By
contrast, when the state takes values within the truthful cutoffs, we might expect senders
to play mixed strategies and to engage in some misreporting activity. As the following
lemma shows, these two conjectures turn out to be correct in every direct equilibrium.
Lemma 5. In a direct equilibrium, Sj(θ) = {θ} for all θ /∈ (θ1, θ2), and |Sj(θ)|> 1 for
every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), j ∈ {1, 2}.
This result, together with the previous observation that (θ1, θ2) ⊂ [τ1, τ2], shows an
interesting characteristic of direct equilibria: in relatively extreme states, both senders
always deliver matching and truthful reports even though they have opposing interests.
Since senders’ reports coincide, it follows from Lemma 1 that in these cases the decision
maker learns the underlying state. Therefore, full information revelation always occurs in
extreme states that lie outside the truthful cutoffs.
Given the results outlined above, from now on I focus on players’ behavior when the
state takes values within the truthful cutoffs. I proceed by first studying the reporting
strategies when senders misreport their private information. Conditional on misreporting
in state θ, sender j’s strategy φj(θ) has support in the set Sj(θ) \ {θ}. To describe and
study equilibrium supports and strategies, it is useful to understand if such set is convex
or not. The next lemma tells us that Sj(θ) \ {θ} is always convex.
Lemma 6. In a direct equilibrium, Sj(θ) \{θ} is convex for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and j ∈ {1, 2}.
The intuition behind Lemma 6 is the following: in equilibrium, the presence of a
“hole” in the set Sj(θ) \ {θ} must imply that j’s opponent never wastes resources to swing
reports that are in such a hole, as they are never delivered. However, this means that in
Sj(θ) \ {θ} there are two different reports that yield approximately the same probability
of inducing the selection of j’s preferred alternative but have different costs. This cannot
be possible in an equilibrium, and therefore the set Sj(θ) \ {θ} must be convex.
While senders may misrepresent the same state in a number of ways, the above
argument also suggests that, conditional on misreporting, there is no report that they
deliver with strictly positive probability. To see why, suppose by way of contradiction that
sender j misreports some state θ by delivering rj ∈ Sj(θ) \ {θ} with some strictly positive
“mass” probability αj(rj, θ) > 0. That is, j’s strategy φj(θ) has an atom in rj. It follows
that sender −j’s expected payoff is discontinuous around r−j = s(rj), and therefore s(rj)
cannot be in the interior28 of S−j(θ). If s(rj) /∈ S−j(θ), then j can profitably “move” the
27These results are formalized by Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.2.
28Recall that every report in the equilibrium support must yield the same expected payoff.
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atom to some cheaper report that ensures the selection of its own favorite alternative.
If instead s(rj) is on the boundary of S−j(θ), then one of the two senders would have a
profitable deviation: either there are reports outside S−j(θ) that yield an higher expected
payoff than reports inside the support, or there is some report that dominates rj. In
both cases, we obtain a contradiction with j’s strategy being part of an equilibrium.
The following lemma formalizes the idea that the equilibrium reporting strategies are
non-atomic whenever senders misreport their private information.29
Lemma 7. In a direct equilibrium, strategies φj(θ) have no atoms in Sj(θ) \ {θ} for every
θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and j ∈ {1, 2}.
5.2.1 Strategies, Supports, and Beliefs
I am now ready to state the main results of this section. Lemmata 6 and 7 tell us that,
conditional on misreporting, senders play an atomless reporting strategy with support in
a convex set. By using the method of payoff-equation, I obtain the partial probability
densities ψj(rj, θ). The next proposition establishes senders’ misreporting behavior.
Proposition 2. In a direct equilibrium, for every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j,
sender j delivers report rj ∈ Sj(θ) \ {θ} according to
ψj(rj, θ) =
ki
−ui(θ)
dCi(s(rj), θ)
drj
.
Each sender’s misreporting behavior depends directly on its opponent’s utility and
costs, while it may only depend indirectly on its own characteristics through the swing
report function s(r). Whether a sender is more likely to deliver small lies or large
misrepresentations, depends on the shape of its opponent’s misreporting costs function
together with the shape of the swing report function, where the latter is determined in
equilibrium. In Section 6.1 I discuss more in detail the senders’ misreporting behavior for
the particular case where senders have symmetric features.
Since the sets Sj(θ)\{θ} are convex and the strategies φj(θ) are atomless on Sj(θ)\{θ},
I can integrate the partial probability densities ψj to pin down the senders’ equilibrium
supports. This procedure allows me to prove the the next proposition.
Proposition 3. In a direct equilibrium, for every state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), supports Sj(θ) are
S1(θ) = {θ} ∪ [max {s(θ), θ} ,min {r̄1(θ), s (r
¯
2(θ))}] ,
S2(θ) = {θ} ∪ [max {r
¯
2(θ), s (r̄1(θ))} ,min {s(θ), θ}] .
29The intuition of results provided in this section omits a number of additional steps that are necessary
to prove Lemmata 6 and 7. See Lemmata A.2 to A.7 in Appendix A.2.
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So far, I focused the analysis on senders’ misreporting behavior. However, the above
proposition shows that “the truth” is always part of equilibrium supports. Having fully
characterized the senders’ misreporting strategies ψj(·, θ) and supports Sj(θ), I can now
proceed to establish senders’ truthful reporting behavior.
Proposition 4. In a direct equilibrium, for every state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), strategies φj(θ) have
an atom at rj = θ of size αj(θ), where
α1(θ) =



k2
−u2(θ)
C2 (s(θ), θ) if θ ∈ [0, θ2)
1 − k2
−u2(θ)
C2 (s(r̄1(θ)), θ) if θ ∈ (θ1, 0],
α2(θ) =



1 − k1
u1(θ)
C1 (s(r
¯
2(θ)), θ) if θ ∈ [0, θ2)
k1
u1(θ)
C1 (s(θ), θ) if θ ∈ (θ1, 0].
Both senders report truthfully with strictly positive probability in almost every state.
The only exception is θ = 0, where the truth is never reported as α1(0) = α2(0) = 0. With
probability α1(θ)α2(θ) both senders deliver the truth, and by Lemma 1 we obtain that
whenever this event occurs the decision maker fully learns the realized state. Moreover,
by Proposition 3 we get that the decision maker may learn the realized state even when
only one of the two senders reports truthfully: if the realized state is positive, then full
revelation occurs whenever sender 2 reports truthfully; if the state is negative, then full
revelation occurs when sender 1 reports truthfully. In these cases, senders deliver different
reports which nevertheless recommend the decision maker to select same alternative.
The probability that full revelation takes place and the probability of observing congru-
ent reports are both increasing as the realized state is further away from zero.30 Therefore,
in direct equilibria we obtain that the revelation of the state and the congruence of reports
are phenomena that are more likely to occur in extreme states than in intermediate or
central states. To see this, note that
dα1(θ)
dθ
=



k2
u2(θ)2
du2(θ)
dθ
C2 (s(θ), θ) +
k2
−u2(θ)
dC2(s(θ),θ)
dθ
> 0 if θ ∈ [0, θ2)
− k2
u2(θ)2
du2(θ)
dθ
C2 (s(r̄1(θ)), θ) −
k2
−u2(θ)
dC2(s(r̄1(θ)),θ)
dθ
< 0 if θ ∈ (θ1, 0),
dα2(θ)
dθ
=



k1
u1(θ)2
du1(θ)
dθ
C1 (s(r
¯
2(θ)), θ) −
k1
u1(θ)
dC1(s(r
¯2
(θ)),θ)
dθ
> 0 if θ ∈ [0, θ2)
− k1
u1(θ)2
du1(θ)
dθ
C1 (s(θ), θ) +
k1
u1(θ)
dC1(s(θ),θ)
dθ
< 0 if θ ∈ (θ1, 0).
Figure 2 depicts both the probability that senders deliver the same report and the
probability that the decision maker fully learns the realized state.
After obtaining the senders’ equilibrium supports and strategies, I can now proceed to
study the decision maker’s posterior beliefs. It is key for this analysis to understand how
30This is because the decision maker’s threshold τdm is normalized to zero.
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Figure 2: The probability that the decision maker fully learns the state (dashed black line)
and the probability that senders deliver matching reports (full black line) as functions of
the realized state in a direct equilibrium of a symmetric environment with linear utilities
and quadratic loss misreporting costs.
beliefs p determine the decision maker’s choice given any pair of reports. To this end, it
is sufficient to examine how posterior beliefs shape the swing report function s(r). By
Lemma 4, we have that s(r) ∈ R̂ for every r ∈ R̂, with s(r) < 0 if r > 0, s(r) > 0 if r < 0,
and s(0) = 0. Given the supports and the strategies as in Propositions 2, 3, and 4, we
obtain that every pair of reports (r1, r2) such that r
¯
2(0) ≤ r2 < 0 < r1 ≤ r̄1(0) is on-path.
By Definition 5 and Lemma 4 we have that, for a pair of reports (r1, r2 = s(r1)),
Udm(r1, s(r1)) = Udm(s(r2), r2) =
∫
Θ
udm(θ)p(θ|r1, s(r1))dθ = 0.
Therefore, I can use p(r1, s(r1)|θ) = φ1(r1, θ) · φ2(s(r1), θ) and previous results to show
how posterior beliefs p pin down the swing report function s(r) in a direct equilibrium.
The next proposition shows how the swing report depends on the model’s parameters.
Proposition 5. In a direct equilibrium, the swing report function s(ri) is implicitly defined
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and ri ∈ R̂, as
s(ri) =
{
rj ∈ Rj
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ min{r1,r
¯
−1
2
(r2)}
max{r2,r̄−11 (r1)}
f(θ)
udm(θ)
u1(θ)u2(θ)
dCj(rj, θ)
drj
dCi(ri, θ)
dri
dθ = 0
}
. (4)
5.2.2 Uniqueness, Robustness, and Existence
Propositions 2 to 5 complete the characterization of direct equilibria. However, there
are three potential issues that must be addressed: first, there may be multiple direct
equilibria which yield different solutions; second, direct equilibria may not be robust to
the refinements introduced and discussed in Section 4, and thus they may be unreasonable;
third, direct equilibria might not exists at all. I conclude this section by showing that
direct equilibria are essentially unique, are robust, and always exist.
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The issue of multiplicity is cleared out by the observation that equation (4), which
implicitly determines the swing report function s(r), depends only on the primitives of the
model. In particular, the swing report function depends on the prior beliefs, the players’
utilities, and the senders’ costs only. Given these primitives, the swing report function is
the same in every direct equilibrium, and therefore also the senders’ reporting strategies
and supports are the same across all direct equilibria. Conditions (C) and (D) are thus
sufficient to ensure that all equilibria are essentially unique in the sense that they are all
strategy and outcome equivalent.
Corollary 1. Direct equilibria are essentially unique.
In Section 4, I find that all pure strategy and all receiver-efficient equilibria are not
plausible for two different reasons: they feature informational free-riding opportunities
that generate individual profitable deviations, and they are not robust to the presence of
even arbitrarily small noise in communication. Robustness to informational free-riding
opportunities and to noise require equilibria to support unprejudiced beliefs (Bagwell &
Ramey, 1991) and to be ε-robust (Battaglini, 2002), respectively. I also show that these
two different criteria are tightly connected, as ε-robust equilibria have unprejudiced beliefs.
The question is: can direct equilibria support unprejudiced beliefs and be ε-robust?
To study whether there exists direct equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs I apply the
following definition, which is adapted from Bagwell and Ramey (1991) to accommodate
for non-degenerate mixed strategies.31
Definition 7. Given senders’ strategies φj, beliefs p are unprejudiced if, for every off-path
pair of reports (r1, r2) such that φj(rj, θ
′) > 0 for some j ∈ {1, 2} and θ′ ∈ Θ, we have
that p(θ′′|r1, r2) > 0 if and only if there is a sender i ∈ {1, 2} such that φi(ri, θ
′′) > 0.
The next corollary confirms that there exists direct equilibria supported by unprejudiced
beliefs (as in both Definition 2 and 7) that are also ε-robust.32
Corollary 2. There are direct equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs that are also ε-robust.
Even well behaved signaling games may have no equilibria (Manelli, 1996). However,
given beliefs p, the equilibrium reporting strategies and supports in Proposition 2 to 4 are
by construction such that no sender has individual profitable deviations. Moreover, given
such strategies, the decision maker choice is sequentially rational. Therefore, as long as
the assumptions established in Section 3 are satisfied, a direct equilibrium always exists.
Corollary 3. A direct equilibrium always exists.
31Definition 2, which is introduced by Vida and Honryo (2019) and is used in Section 4, is a weaker
version of Definition 7. Lemma 3 applies to unprejudiced beliefs as in both definitions.
32Since ε-robustness implies unprejudiced beliefs, it would be sufficient to show that there exist direct
equilibria that are ε-robust. Corollary 2 simply remarks that the two refinements are different.
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6 An Example and Application
6.1 Example: Symmetric Environments
As follows, I provide an example where senders have similar features and the state is
symmetrically distributed. This environment is an important benchmark because it
deals with situations where no sender is ex-ante advantaged. In addition, it gives us
a closed-form solution for senders’ equilibrium strategies and supports. The following
definition formalizes what I mean by a “symmetric environment.”
Definition 8. In a symmetric environment,
i) the state is symmetrically distributed around zero, i.e., f(θ) = f(−θ) for all θ ∈ Θ;
ii) kjCj(r, θ) = kC(r, θ) for j ∈ {1, 2}, where k > 0 and C(·) satisfies C(θ + x, θ) =
C(θ − x, θ) for every θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ R;
iii) payoffs satisfy33 udm(θ) = −udm(−θ) and u1(θ) = −u2(−θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Conditions i) to iii) are in addition to the assumptions in Section 3.
In symmetric environments the two senders differ only because they have opposed
interests. In these cases, there is no particular reason why the decision maker should give
more importance to the report of one sender than the other. Intuition would suggest that,
in a symmetric environment, the decision maker should equally assign the “burden of
proof” among senders. The next corollary confirms that this intuition is indeed correct in
a direct equilibrium.
Corollary 4. In a direct equilibrium of a symmetric environment, s(r) = −r for every
r ∈ R̂.
In a symmetric environment, the decision maker follows the recommendation of the
sender that delivers the most extreme report. The burden of proof is equally distributed
among senders, as Corollary 4 shows. Moreover, the swing report function is linear even
though some fundamentals, e.g., the costs functions, may be non-linear. Remarkably, in
symmetric environments direct equilibria naturally display symmetric strategies.34
With an explicit solution for the swing report function, we obtain a natural closed-form
solution for the senders’ equilibrium strategies and supports. In applications this is
particularly useful because in similar environments, such as in contests, typically little
33By definition of threshold τj (see Section 3), this last condition implies that τ2 = −τ1.
34Corollary 4 is reminiscent of results in all-pay contests or auctions, where it is shown that with two
bidders or contestants, only symmetric solutions exists (Baye et al., 1996). Moreover, in all-pay auctions
the bidder with the highest bid (or the greatest effort) always wins. By contrast, here the sender with the
most extreme report wins, but it may not be the one paying the highest misreporting costs.
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Figure 3: The partial probability density ψ as a function of the misreporting costs’ shape
and of the extent of misreporting, in a symmetric environment where C(r, θ) = |(r− θ)exp|
and θ = 0. With square loss costs, exp = 2, the density ψ grows linearly as reports get
further away from the truth. With absolute value linear costs, exp = 1, every misreport
in the support has the same partial density. With concave costs, exp ∈ (0, 1), small
misrepresentation are more likely than large lies, and when exp > 1 the opposite is true.
is known about mixed strategy equilibria except in some special cases (see Levine and
Mattozzi (2019); Siegel (2009)).
I can now use this closed-form solution to examine the determinants and the features of
senders’ misreporting behavior. I show that the shape of the costs function, in particular
its convexity/concavity or second derivative, determines whether senders are more likely to
deliver large lies than small misrepresentation or the other way around. From Proposition 2
and Corollary 4 we obtain that, in a symmetric environment, misreporting behavior is
described by the following partial density, for j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i,
ψj(rj, θ) =
k
−ui(θ)
dC(−rj, θ)
drj
.
Therefore, if C(·) is strictly convex, we have that dψ1(r1, θ)/dr1 > 0 for all θ ∈
S1(θ) \ {θ} and dψ2(r2, θ)/dr2 < 0 for all θ ∈ S2(θ) \ {θ}. This means that, conditional
on misreporting, senders are more likely to deliver large misrepresentation of the state
rather than small lies. By contrast, when senders have concave costs, misreports that are
closer to the truth are more likely to be delivered than large lies. The type of senders’
interim misreporting behavior is entirely driven by the shape of the cost function C, and
not by k or by utilities uj. Figure 3 shows senders’ misreporting behavior for different
concavities of the misreporting costs function.
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6.2 Application: Judicial Procedures
In a seminal paper, Shin (1998) compares the informative value of adversarial and
inquisitorial procedures. Under the adversarial procedure, two parties with opposing
interests make their case to an uninformed decision maker. By contrast, the inquisitorial
procedure requires the decision maker to adjudicate only based on her own acquired
information. The question of which procedure allows the decision maker to take more
informed decisions is of interest in a host of applications.
To answer this question, Shin (1998) studies a model of verifiable disclosure where
parties can either disclose or withhold information, but they cannot misrepresent evidence
because such information is fully verifiable. In the adversarial procedure, the decision
maker cannot rely on the information of the interested parties to secure full revelation
because the two parties may be uninformed. In the inquisitorial procedure, the decision
maker obtains with some probability an informative signal of the underlying evidence.
The tension faced by the decision maker is thus that of obtaining two pieces of biased
information versus one piece of unbiased information. Within this framework, Shin (1998)
finds that the adversarial procedure is always superior to the inquisitorial procedure.
This sharp result raises a natural question: why then systems that are reminiscent of
inquisitorial procedures so are often used in practice? On this point, Shin (1998) argues
that the assumption of full verifiability might play a key role in determining the superiority
of adversarial procedures, and that “potential violations of the verifiability assumption
will be an important limiting factor in qualifying our findings in favor of the adversarial
procedure” (Shin, 1998, p. 403).
Here, I analyze the validity of this conjecture by using results derived in this paper.
The framework introduced in Section 3 allows me to model the adversarial procedure for
when information is not fully verifiable and parties can misrepresent evidence. Results
derived in Section 4 suggest that under this procedure the decision maker cannot plausibly
achieve receiver-efficiency and obtain the full information welfare Wfi. Moreover, if we
accept that conditions (C) and (D) are sensible modeling assumptions, then results in
Section 5 indicate that the ex-ante equilibrium welfare of the decision maker is also strictly
lower and bounded away from Wfi. To see this, notice that the expected payoff obtained
by the decision maker in direct equilibria is bounded above by W̄dm, where
35
W̄dm =
∫ max Θ
0
f(θ)udm(θ)dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Wfi
+
∫ 0
θ1
f(θ)udm(θ)(1 − α1(θ))α2(θ)dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< Wfi.
35The upper bound W̄dm is obtained by assuming that the decision maker makes less mistakes than
she would in a direct equilibrium: she mistakenly selects +© only when θ ∈ (θ1, 0) and sender 2 reports
truthfully while sender 1 misreports. Otherwise, she chooses the correct alternative. Therefore, W̄dm is
an upper bound of the ex-ante welfare obtained by the decision maker in direct equilibria.
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To model the inquisitorial procedure, I follow Shin (1998) in assuming that the decision
maker obtains with probability q a potentially noisy signal σ of the realized state θ. It is
straight forward to see that, under the inquisitorial procedure, the decision maker can
obtain an expected payoff which, for high q and sufficiently precise σ, is arbitrarily close
to Wfi and thus higher than W̄dm. Therefore, there is always a combination of parameters
under which the inquisitorial procedure is superior to the adversarial procedure in that
it yields more information to the decision maker. The conjecture of Shin (1998) is thus
proved correct for any finite intensity of misreporting costs kj > 0.
It is worth pointing out that, in addition to the verifiability assumption, there are
other modeling differences between my setting and Shin (1998): first, I assume that the
two parties are always perfectly informed about the realized state, while in Shin (1998)
they may be uninformed or observe a noisy signal of the realized state; second, I consider
a decision maker that is less informed than the two parties, while in Shin (1998) every
player is, on average, equally informed.36 These two differences give in my setting a
relative advantage to the adversarial procedure, and therefore add further force to the
potential superiority of inquisitorial procedures.37
7 Concluding Remarks
This article studies a multi-sender signaling model with two informed senders and one
uninformed decision maker. Senders have perfectly correlated information, which they
can misreport at a cost that is tied to the magnitude of misrepresentation. This setting
covers a number of applications in economics and politics, including electoral campaigns,
contested takeovers, lobbying, informative advertising, and judicial decision making.
I restrict attention to equilibria where the decision maker’s posterior beliefs satisfy a
first-order stochastic dominance condition. Fully revealing, receiver-efficient, and pure
strategy equilibria exist, but they are not robust. I identify two natural restrictions on the
decision maker’s posterior beliefs under which equilibria always exists, are robust, and are
essentially unique. I dub equilibria that satisfy these two conditions as “direct equilibria.”
Therefore, this paper provides a tractable and appealing approach to study strategic
communication from multiple senders with common information that is neither fully
verifiable nor totally “cheap.” As an application of direct equilibria, I study the informative
value of judicial procedures and show that, when information is not fully verifiable, then
inquisitorial systems may be superior than adversarial systems.
36In Shin (1998), as we increase the decision maker’s ability to gather precise information in the
inquisitorial system, we also increase the information possessed in expectation by the contending parties
precisely because all players are assumed to be equally informed on average.
37Moreover, in my setting “withholding” is not possible or it is prohibitively expensive. In Shin (1998),
if parties are perfectly informed but cannot withhold information, then the decision maker could obtain
full revelation out of the adversarial procedure, making it always superior than the inquisitorial system.
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The transmission of information in direct equilibria takes place in a qualitatively
different way with respect to related models of strategic communication. I conclude that
the introduction of misreporting costs is not just a technical twist that adds an element
of realism; rather, it is an essential component to understand the strategic interaction
underlying the setting considered in this paper.38
38Accounting for misreporting costs also allows to perform comparative statics on such costs that are
currently unexplored. For example, it allows to study the effects of “fake news laws” or of technological
advancements such as “deepfake videos” which affect senders’ misreporting costs. This is left for future
research.
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A Appendix
Lemma 1. In every perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying (FOSD), minSj(θ) ≥ θ for
θ ≥ τj and max Sj(θ) ≤ θ otherwise, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a PBE satisfying (FOSD) and consider a state θ ≥ τ1. For
sender 1, every report r1 < θ is dominated by truthful reporting because C1(r1, θ) >
0 = C1(θ, θ) and by (FOSD) we have that Udm(θ, r2) ≥ Udm(r1, r2) for every r2 ∈ R2.
Therefore, it must be that r1 /∈ S1(θ) for all r1 < θ and θ ≥ τ1. A similar argument applies
to sender 2 and to states θ ≤ τj, j ∈ {1, 2}.
A.1 Receiver-efficient and Pure Strategy Equilibria
Lemma 2. An equilibrium is receiver-efficient if and only if it is in pure strategies.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a pure strategy equilibrium and suppose that it is not receiver-
efficient, e.g., because β(ρ1(θ
′), ρ2(θ
′)) = -© for some θ′ ≥ 0. In equilibrium, senders never
engage in misreporting to implement their less preferred alternative with certainty, and
therefore it must be that ρ1(θ
′) = θ′. Beliefs p must be such that β(r1, ρ2(θ
′)) = -© for
all r1 ∈ (r
¯
1(θ
′), r̄1(θ
′)), otherwise sender 1 would have a profitable deviation. The pair
of reports (θ′, ρ2(θ
′)) can induce -© only if (ρ1(θ
′′), ρ2(θ
′′)) = (θ′, ρ2(θ
′)) for some θ′′ < 0.
There is no θ ∈ [τ1, 0) such that sender 1 would misreport by delivering r1 = θ
′ ≥ 0 to
implement -©, thus it must be that θ′′ < τ1. Since there is always a r
′
1 ∈ (r¯
1(θ
′), θ′) such that
C1(r
′
1, θ
′′) < C1(θ
′, θ′′) and β(r′1, ρ2(θ
′′)) = -©, sender 1 has a profitable deviation in state
θ′′, contradicting that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is not receiver-efficient.
Now consider a REE and suppose that it is not in pure strategies, but there is a state
θ′ ∈ Θ and sender j ∈ {1, 2} such that Sj(θ
′) ⊇ {r′j, r
′′
j }, with r
′
j 6= r
′′
j . Since in a REE
we have that β(r′1, r
′
2) = β(r
′′
1 , r
′′
2) for every r
′
i, r
′′
i ∈ Si(θ), i ∈ {1, 2}, it must be that
Cj(r
′
j, θ
′) = Cj(r
′′
j , θ
′). By Lemma 1, this is possible only if r′j = r
′′
j , contradicting that
there exists a REE that is not in pure strategies.
Proposition 1. There are no receiver-efficient equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs.
Proof of Proposition 1. In a REE, senders play pure strategies (Lemma 2) and the decision
maker always selects her preferred alternative as if under complete information, that is,
β(ρ1(θ), ρ2(θ)) = +© for all θ ≥ 0 and β(ρ1(θ), ρ2(θ)) = -© otherwise. Since misreporting
is costly, senders report truthfully in states where their least preferred alternative is
implemented: ρ2(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [0, τ2] and ρ1(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [τ1, 0). However,
there are no REE where ρj(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [τ1, τ2], j ∈ {1, 2}: there would always be a
state θ ∈ (τ1, τ2) and an off-path pair of reports (r1, r2), r1 6= r2, such that a sender can
profitably deviate from truthful reporting (see also Observation 1). Therefore, in every
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REE either sender 1 misreports in some state θ ∈ [0, τ2), or sender 2 misreports in some
θ ∈ (τ1, 0], or both.
Consider now a REE where ρ1(θ
′) 6= θ′ for some θ′ ∈ [0, τ2). By Lemma 1, we
have that ρ1(θ
′) > θ′. To sustain the equilibrium, off-path beliefs p must be such that
β(r1, θ
′) = -© for all r1 ∈ [θ
′, ρ1(θ
′)) and β(ρ1(θ
′′), r2) = +© for all r2 ∈ (r
¯
2(θ
′′), θ′′] and
θ′′ ∈ [θ′, τ2). This implies that there must be an open set S of non-negative states such
that ρ1(θ
′′′) ≥ ρ1(θ
′) > θ′′′ = ρ2(θ
′′′) for all θ′′′ ∈ S. It follows that, for every θ′′′ ∈ S, the
pair of reports (θ′′′, θ′′′) is off-path. By Lemma 1, and since ρ2(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [0, τ2] and
ρ1(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [τ1, 0), we have that beliefs p are unprejudiced (Definition 2) only if
p(θ|θ′′′, θ′′′) = 0 for all θ < 0. Therefore, unprejudiced beliefs imply that β(θ′′′, θ′′′) = +©,
and thus sender 1 can profitably deviate by reporting the truth in state θ′′′ ∈ S. A similar
argument applies for REE where ρ2(θ
′) 6= θ′ for some θ′ ∈ (τ1, 0]. Therefore, there are no
REE (and, by Lemma 2, no pure strategy equilibria) with unprejudiced beliefs.
Lemma 3. If a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is ε-robust, then it has unprejudiced beliefs.
Proof. Consider the posterior beliefs pG,ε that the strategies φj of a PBE (see Section 5
for the notation used to describe mixed strategies) induce in an ε-perturbed game for
some distribution G and sequence εn,
pG,ε(θ|r1, r2) = f(θ)
p(r1, r2|θ)
p(r1, r2)
=
f(θ) [ε1ε2g1(r1)g2(r2) + ε1(1 − ε2)g1(r1)φ2(r2, θ) + (1 − ε1)ε2g2(r2)φ1(r1, θ)]
ε1ε2g1(r1)g2(r2) + ε1(1 − ε2)g1(r1)
∫
Θ f(θ)φ2(r2, θ)dθ + (1 − ε1)ε2g2(r2)
∫
Θ f(θ)φ1(r1, θ)dθ
.
As εn → 0+ the event in which both reports are wrongly delivered or observed becomes
negligible, and thus we have that pG,ε → pG,0+ , where
pG,0+(θ|r1, r2) =
f(θ) [ε1g1(r1)φ2(r2, θ) + ε2g2(r2)φ1(r1, θ)]
ε1g1(r1)
∫
Θ f(θ)φ2(r2, θ)dθ + ε2g2(r2)
∫
Θ f(θ)φ1(r1, θ)dθ
. (5)
From (5) we obtain that, for any distribution G with full support and any sequence
εn → 0+, pG,0+(θ|r1, r2) > 0 if and only if φj(rj, θ) > 0 for some j ∈ {1, 2}. By Definition 7
(and thus even by Definition 2) we get that the limit beliefs pG,0+ are unprejudiced, and
therefore every PBE that is ε-robust has unprejudiced beliefs.39
A.2 Direct Equilibria
Lemma 4. In a direct equilibrium, every report r ∈ R̂ has a swing report s(r) ∈ R̂ such
that (i) if r ≷ 0 then s(r) ≶ 0 and s(0) = 0; (ii) s(s(r)) = r; (iii) for every r ∈ R̂,
39Notice that the proof of Lemma 3 readily extends to a n-senders version of the game, for any finite
n ≥ 2. In particular, given a profile of reports (r1, . . . , rn) and a set of senders N = {1, . . . , n}, then
pG,0+(θ|r1, . . . , rn) > 0 if and only if φj(rj , θ) > 0 for n − 1 senders. This is consistent with the idea
behind unprejudiced beliefs that the decision maker conjectures deviations as individual.
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ds(r)
dr
< 0; (iv) s (r̄1(0)) = r
¯
2(0).
Proof. Consider a report r1 by sender 1 such that r1 ∈ (0, r̄1(0)]. By (C) and (D) we obtain
that Udm(r1, r
¯
2(0)) < 0 < Udm(r1, 0), and therefore there must exists a r2 ∈ [r
¯
2(0), 0)
such that Udm(r1, r2) = 0. Thus, r2 = s(r1). A similar argument holds for a report
r2 ∈ [r
¯
2(0), 0). It follows that, for every r ∈ R̂, there exists a s(r) ∈ R̂ such that if r > 0
then s(r) < 0, and if r < 0 then s(r) > 0. From (C) and Definition 5 we obtain that
s(0) = 0 and s (r̄1(0)) = r
¯
2(0). From Definition 5 and point (i) we get that if r
′ = s(r)
then r = s(r′), and thus s(s(r)) = r. By applying the implicit function theorem and (D)
on s(r), we obtain that for every r ∈ R̂, ds(r)
dr
< 0.
Lemma A.1. In a direct equilibrium, truthful cutoffs are such that θ1 < 0 < θ2 and
(θ1, θ2) ⊂ [τ1, τ2] ∩ R̂.
Proof. By Lemma 4 we have that s (r̄1(0)) = r
¯
2(0) < 0 and, for every r ∈ R̂, ds(r)/dr < 0.
Moreover, dr
¯
2(θ)/dθ > 0 and thus r
¯
2(θ) > r
¯
2(0) for every θ > 0. Since s(0) = 0, there
is a state θ′ ∈ (0, r̄1(0)) such that s(θ
′) = r
¯
2(θ
′). From Definition 5, we obtain that
θ′ = θ2 ∈ (0, r̄1(0)). Similarly, we get that θ1 ∈ (r
¯
2(0), 0). Since r̄1(τ1) = τ1 < 0 and
r
¯
2(τ2) = τ2 > 0, it follows from Definition 6 that (θ1, θ2) ⊂ [τ1, τ2].
Lemma 5. In a direct equilibrium, Sj(θ) = {θ} for all θ /∈ (θ1, θ2), and |Sj(θ)|> 1 for
every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. I begin by proving first that Sj(θ) = {θ} for all θ /∈ (θ1, θ2). Consider a DE and
a state θ ≥ θ2. Since by Lemma 1 we have that minS1(θ) ≥ θ ≥ θ2, it must be that
S2(θ) = {θ} as s(r1) ≤ r
¯
2(θ) for every r1 ∈ S1(θ). Since β(θ, θ) = +©, sender 1 best replies
to r2 = θ with r1 = θ and thus S1(θ) = {θ} as well. A similar argument applies to states
θ ≤ θ1, completing the first part of the proof. Note that when θ = θ1, sender 1 is actually
indifferent between reporting θ1 and r̄1(θ1). Since this is a measure zero event which is
irrelevant for the analysis that follows, I will consider only the case where S1(θ1) = {θ1},
without any loss of generality.
I turn now to prove that Sj(θ) contains more than one element for every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2).
Suppose by way of contradiction that S1(θ) = {r1} for some θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). By Lemma 1, we
have that r1 ≥ θ. Consider first the case where θ ≤ r1 < 0. In a DE, sender 2 best replies
to r1 ∈ [θ, 0) with r2 = θ = S2(θ) because, by (C) and (D), we get β(r1, θ) = -©. However,
sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by delivering r′1 = s(θ), where
0 < s(θ) < r̄1(θ) (Lemmata 4 and A.1), contradicting that S1(θ) = {r1}. Consider now
the case where r1 ≥ 0 and r1 ≥ θ. If s(r1) ≤ r
¯
2(θ), then it must be that S2(θ) = {θ}.
By Definition 6 and Lemma 4 we have that r
¯
2(θ) < 0 and r1 ≥ s(r
¯
2(θ)) > 0. Since
r
¯
2(θ) < θ, sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by reporting either
r′1 = s(θ) ∈ (0, r1) if θ < 0, or r
′
1 = θ if θ ≥ 0, as in both cases we get that β(r
′
1, θ) = +©
and C1(r
′
1, θ) < C1(r1, θ). If instead s(r1) > r¯
2(θ), then sender 2 must be delivering some
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r′2 ∈ (r¯
2(θ), s(r1)). Therefore, if r1 > θ, then sender 1 is strictly better off by reporting θ
rather than r1 because β(θ, r
′
2) = β(r1, r
′
2) = -© and C1(r1, θ) > 0 = C1(θ, θ). If instead
r1 = θ, then θ ≥ 0 and since r
¯
2(θ) ≥ r
¯
2(0) we have that s(r
′
2) ≤ r̄1(θ) (Lemma 4). In this
case, sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by reporting r′1 = s(r
′
2).
Similar arguments apply to S2(θ) = {r2}, completing the proof.
Lemma A.2. In a direct equilibrium, for every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) supports Sj(θ) are such that
max S1(θ) ≤ min {r̄1(0), r̄1(θ), s (r
¯
2(θ))} ,
minS2(θ) ≥ max {r
¯
2(0), r
¯
2(θ), s (r̄1(θ))} .
Proof. Consider a DE and a θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). By definition of reach (equations (1) and (2))
every r1 > r̄1(θ) is strictly dominated by truthful reporting, and thus max S1(θ) ≤ r̄1(θ).
Similarly, we obtain that minS2(θ) ≥ r
¯
2(θ) and therefore by (D) and by Definition 5
every r1 > s(r
¯
2(θ)) is dominated by r
′
1 = s(r¯
2(θ)) and every r2 < s(r̄1(θ)) is dominated by
r′2 = s(r̄1(θ)). Thus, max S1(θ) ≤ s(r¯
2(θ)) and minS2(θ) ≥ s(r̄1(θ)). For every θ ∈ [0, θ2)
we have r̄1(θ) ≥ r̄1(0) and r
¯
2(θ) ≥ r
¯
2(0), and thus minS2(θ) ≥ r
¯
2(0). Since s(r
¯
2(0)) = r̄1(0)
(Lemma 4), it follows by (D) and by Definition 5 that s(r2) ≤ r̄1(0) for every r2 ∈ S2(θ),
and thus max S1(θ) ≤ r̄1(0). Similarly, we obtain that minS2(θ) ≥ s(r̄1(0)) for every
θ ∈ (θ1, 0).
Lemma A.3. In a direct equilibrium, r2 /∈ S2(θ) for every r2 ∈ (s(minS1(θ)), θ) and
θ > 0, and r1 /∈ S1(θ) for every r1 ∈ (θ, s(max S2(θ))) and θ < 0.
Proof. Consider a θ ∈ (0, θ2). By Lemmata 1 and 4 we have that s(minS1(θ)) < 0, and
by Definition 5 we have that β(r1, r2) = +© for every r1 ∈ S1(θ) and r2 ∈ (s (minS1(θ)) , θ).
Therefore, for sender 2 every r2 ∈ (s (minS1(θ)) , θ) is strictly dominated by truthful
reporting, and thus r2 /∈ S2(θ). A similar argument applies to sender 1 for θ ∈ (θ1, 0) and
Lemma 5 shows the case θ /∈ (θ1, θ2), completing the proof.
Lemma A.4. In a direct equilibrium, for every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), reports r1 ∈ (minS1(θ),max S1(θ))
have s(r1) > r
¯
2(θ), and reports r2 ∈ (minS2(θ),max S2(θ)) have s(r2) < r̄1(θ).
Proof. Suppose not, and consider r′1 ∈ (minS1(θ),max S1(θ)) for some θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such
that s(r′1) < r¯
2(θ). By Definition 6 we have r
¯
2(θ) < 0 and by Lemma 4 we have s(r
¯
2(θ)) <
r′1. This is in contradiction with Lemma A.2, which states that max S1(θ) ≤ s(r¯
2(θ)). A
similar argument holds for reports r2 ∈ (minS2(θ),max S2(θ)), completing the proof.
Lemma A.5. In a direct equilibrium, αj(rj, θ) = 0 for all rj ∈ (minSj(θ),max Sj(θ)),
j ∈ {1, 2}, and θ ∈ (θ1, θ2).
Proof. Consider a θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and suppose that there is a DE where sender 1’s strategy
φ1(θ) has an atom α1(r
′
1, θ) > 0 in some report r
′
1 ∈ (minS1(θ),max S1(θ)). By Lemma A.4
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we have that s(r′1) > r¯
2(θ). The expected payoff of sender 2 is discontinuous around r2 =
s(r′1) and thus it must be that, for some ǫ > 0 small enough, (s(r
′
1), s(r
′
1) + ǫ) ∩S2(θ) = ∅.
Therefore, there exists an ǫ′ small enough such that sender 1 can profitably deviate from
the prescribed strategy by moving probability from r′1 to some r
′′
1 ∈ (s (s(r
′
1) + ǫ
′) , r′1),
where by Lemma 4 s (s(r′1) + ǫ
′) < r′1, thus contradicting that this is an equilibrium. A
similar argument applies to atoms in sender 2’s strategy, completing the proof.
Lemma A.6. In a direct equilibrium, minS1(θ) = θ for all θ ≥ 0, and max S2(θ) = θ for
all θ ≤ 0.
Proof. Consider a DE and a θ ≥ 0. By Lemma 1, it must be that minS1(θ) ≥ θ. Suppose
by way of contradiction that minS1(θ) > θ. By Lemma 5 it has to be that θ < θ2 and by
Lemma A.3 we obtain that S2(θ)∩(s(minS1(θ)), θ) = ∅. Therefore, unless sender 2’s strat-
egy has an atom α2(s(minS1(θ)), θ) > 0, we have that Φ2(s(minS1(θ)), θ) = Φ2(s(θ), θ).
However, since β(r1, s(minS1(θ))) = +© for all r1 ∈ S1(θ) and C2(s(minS1(θ)), θ) > 0,
it must be that α2(s(minS1(θ)), θ) = 0 as s(minS1(θ)) is strictly dominated by r2 = θ.
Hence, for some ǫ > 0, sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by
moving probability from every r1 ∈ [minS1(θ),minS1(θ) + ǫ) ∩ S1(θ) to r1 = θ, contra-
dicting that there can be a DE with minS1(θ) > θ for a θ ≥ 0. A similar argument holds
for sender 2 and θ ≤ 0, completing the proof.
Lemma A.7. In a direct equilibrium, |Sj(θ)\{θ}|> 1 for every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Consider a DE and a state θ ∈ [0, θ2). By Lemma A.6 we have that minS1(θ) =
θ, and by Lemma 5 we have that |S1(θ)|> 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that
S1(θ) \ {θ} = {r1} for some r1 > 0. Since C1(r1, θ) > 0, in equilibrium it must be that
r1 induces +© with strictly higher probability than truthful reporting. This implies that
there is some r2 ∈ [s(r1), s(θ)) in the support of sender 2’s strategy, r2 ∈ S2(θ). Since
reports that are further away from the realized state are more expensive, it must be that
α2(r
′
2, θ) > 0 for some r
′
2 ∈ [s(r1), s(θ)), and φ2(r2, θ) = 0 for all r2 ∈ [s(r1), r
′
2). But then
sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by moving probability from
r1 to s(r
′
2), contradicting that this is an equilibrium.
Consider now the case where θ ∈ (θ1, 0) and suppose again that S1(θ) \ {θ} = {r1}. By
Lemma 5, we have that |Sj(θ)|> 1 for j ∈ {1, 2}, and thus minS1(θ) = θ. By Lemmata A.2
and A.3 we have that r1 ≥ s(θ) > 0 and max S2(θ) = θ. If r1 = s(θ), then sender 2 can
profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by always reporting θ − ǫ for some ǫ > 0
small enough. If instead r1 > s(θ), then it must be that S2(θ) ∩ [s(r1), θ) = ∅ as every
r2 ∈ [s(r1), θ) would be strictly dominated by truthful reporting. Since |S2(θ)|> 1, there
must be some r2 < s(r1) such that r2 ∈ S2(θ). Therefore, sender 1 can profitably deviate
by moving probability from r1 to s(θ), contradicting that this is an equilibrium. A similar
argument applies to S2(θ) \ {θ}, completing the proof.
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Lemma 6. In a direct equilibrium, Sj(θ) \{θ} is convex for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Consider a DE and a state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). By Lemma A.7 we have that |Sj(θ)\{θ}|> 1,
j ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose by way of contradiction that S1(θ) \ {θ} is not convex, but instead
there are two reports r′1, r
′′
1 ∈ S1(θ) \ {θ} with r
′
1 < r
′′
1 , such that r1 /∈ S1(θ) \ {θ} for
every r1 ∈ (r
′
1, r
′′
1). By Lemmata 1, 4, and A.3 we have that r
′
1 > 0, r
′
1 ≥ s(θ), and
s(r′′1) < s(r
′
1) < 0. Since C1(r
′′
1 , θ) > C1(r
′
1, θ) and
dCj(r,θ)
dr
> 0 for every r > θ, it must be
that every report r1 ≥ r
′′
1 such that φ1(r1, θ) > 0 induces the implementation of alternative
+© with a strictly higher probability than every report r′′′1 ≤ r
′
1 such that φ1(r
′′′
1 , θ) > 0.
This is possible only if r2 ∈ S2(θ) for some r2 ∈ [s(r
′′
1), s(r
′
1)]. Since Φ1(r1, θ) is constant
for all r1 ∈ (r
′
1, r
′′
1), it must be that sender 2’s strategy has an atom α2(r2, θ) > 0 in
some r2 ∈ (s(r
′′
1), s(r
′
1)], and φ2(r
′
2, θ) = 0 for all r
′
2 ∈ [s(r
′′
1), s(r
′
1)] such that r
′
2 6= r2.
However, for some ǫ > 0 small enough, sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed
strategy by moving probability from all r1 ∈ [r
′′
1 , r
′′
1 + ǫ) such that r1 ∈ S1(θ) to s(r2) < r
′′
1 ,
contradicting that this is an equilibrium. A similar argument applies to S2(θ) \ {θ},
completing the proof.
Lemma 7. In a direct equilibrium, strategies φj(θ) have no atoms in Sj(θ) \ {θ} for every
θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Lemma 5 shows that |Sj(θ)|> 1 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and Lemma A.5 shows that
φj(θ) has no atoms in (minSj(θ),max Sj(θ)). Consider a θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), and suppose
that φ1(θ) has an atom in max S1(θ), i.e., α1(max S1(θ), θ) > 0. By Lemma A.2, we
have that max S1(θ) ≤ min{s(r
¯
2(θ)), r̄1(θ)} and minS2(θ) ≥ max{r
¯
2(θ), s(r̄1(θ))}. If
minS2(θ) > s(max S1(θ)), then sender 1 can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy
by moving probability from the atom in max S1(θ) to some r1 ∈ [s(minS2(θ)),max S1(θ)).
If minS2(θ) = s(max S1(θ)), then, since the probability of implementing -© is discontinuous
in r2 = s(max S1(θ)), it must be that r
′
2 /∈ S2(θ) for all r
′
2 ∈ [s(max S1(θ)), s(max S1(θ))+ǫ]
and some ǫ > 0. Otherwise, sender 2 could profitably deviate by moving probability from
some r′2 ∈ [s(max S1(θ)), s(max S1(θ)) + ǫ] to some report r
′′
2 = s(max S2(θ)) − ǫ
′ for some
ǫ′ > 0. However, this would contradict Lemmata A.7 and 6, and thus it would not be
possible in a DE.
Suppose now that φ1(θ) has an atom in minS1(θ), i.e., α1(minS1(θ), θ) > 0. By
Lemma A.6, if θ ≥ 0 then minS1(θ) = θ, and thus suppose that θ ∈ (θ1, 0) and that
minS1(θ) > θ when θ < 0. By Lemmata 4, A.3, and A.6 we have that minS1(θ) ≥ s(θ) > 0.
If minS1(θ) = s(θ), then it must be that φ2(θ, θ) = 0, otherwise sender 2 could profitably
deviate from the prescribed strategy by moving probability from θ to θ− ǫ for some ǫ > 0
small enough. But then, the atom in minS1(θ) would be strictly dominated by truthful
reporting as C1(s(θ), θ) > 0 and β(s(θ), r2) = -© for every r2 ∈ S2(θ), contradicting that
this is an equilibrium. Consider now the case where minS1(θ) > s(θ). By definition,
we have that Φ1(r1, θ) = 0 for every r1 < minS1(θ), and by Lemma 4 we have that
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s(minS1(θ)) < θ. Therefore, it must be that φ2(r2, θ) = 0 for every r2 ∈ [s(minS1(θ)), θ).
However this implies that, for sender 1, minS1(θ) is dominated by s(θ), contradicting that
this can be an equilibrium. Similar arguments hold for atoms α2(r2, θ) for r2 ∈ S2(θ) \{θ},
completing the proof.
Proposition 2. In a direct equilibrium, for every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j,
sender j delivers report rj ∈ Sj(θ) \ {θ} according to
ψj(rj, θ) =
ki
−ui(θ)
dCi(s(rj), θ)
drj
.
Proof. Consider a DE and a state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Given strategy φ1(θ), sender 2 gets
an expected utility of W ω2 (r2, θ) = (1 − Φ1(s(r2), θ))u2(θ) − k2C2(r2, θ) from delivering
r2 ∈ S2(θ)\{θ}. By Lemmata 6 and 7 we have that Sj(θ)\{θ} is convex and atomless. By
Lemmata 1, A.1, and A.2, we have that Sj(θ) ⊂ R̂ for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), and thus by Lemma 4
we have that ds(r)
dr
< 0 for all rj ∈ Sj(θ). Therefore, we can apply the method of payoff-
equation: by setting
dW ω
2
(r2,θ)
dr2
= 0, and since φj(rj, θ) = ψj(rj, θ) for all rj ∈ Sj(θ) \ {θ}
(Lemma 7), we obtain the partial pdf ψ1(s(r2), θ) =
k2
−u2(θ)
dC2(r2,θ)
dr2
dr2
ds(r2)
= k2
−u2(θ)
dC2(r2,θ)
ds(r2)
.
By replacing r1 = s(r2) we obtain that ψ1(r1, θ) =
k2
−u2(θ)
dC2(s(r1),θ)
dr1
for r1 ∈ S1(θ) \ {θ}.
Similarly, we obtain that for r2 ∈ S2(θ) \ {θ}, ψ2(r2, θ) =
k1
−u1(θ)
dC1(s(r2),θ)
dr2
.
Lemma A.8. In a direct equilibrium, S1(θ) is convex for all θ ≥ 0 and S2(θ) is convex
for all θ ≤ 0.
Proof. Consider a DE and suppose by way of contradiction that S1(θ) is not convex
for some θ ∈ [0, θ2). By Lemma A.6 we have that minS1(θ) = θ, and by Lemma 6 we
have that S1(θ) \ {θ} is convex. Therefore, it must be that minS1(θ) \ {θ} > θ and
φ1(r1, θ) = 0 for every r1 ∈ (θ,minS1(θ) \ {θ}). In equilibrium, every r1 > minS1(θ)\{θ}
such that φ1(r1, θ) > 0 must yield the implementation of alternative +© with strictly higher
probability than truthful reporting, as C1(r1, θ) > 0. This is possible only if φ2(r2, θ) > 0
for some r2 ∈ [s (minS1(θ) \ {θ}) , s(θ)). However, for some ǫ > 0 small enough, it must
be that φ2(r
′
2, θ) = 0 for every r
′
2 ∈ [s (minS1(θ) \ {θ}) , s(θ) − ǫ), as every such a report
r′2 is dominated by reporting s(θ) − ǫ. Therefore, there exists an ǫ
′ > 0 such that sender 1
can profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy by moving probability from reports
in the set [minS1(θ) \ {θ},minS1(θ) \ {θ} + ǫ
′) to s(s(θ) − ǫ), contradicting that this is
an equilibrium. Lemma 5 considers the case where θ /∈ (θ1, θ2), and a similar argument
applies to states θ ≤ 0 and support S2(θ).
Proposition 3. In a direct equilibrium, for every state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), supports Sj(θ) are
S1(θ) = {θ} ∪ [max {s(θ), θ} ,min {r̄1(θ), s (r
¯
2(θ))}] ,
S2(θ) = {θ} ∪ [max {r
¯
2(θ), s (r̄1(θ))} ,min {s(θ), θ}] .
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Proof. Consider a direct equilibrium and a state θ ∈ [0, θ2). Since for every θ ≥ 0 we have
that θ ∈ S1(θ) (Lemma A.6) and both sets S1(θ) and S1(θ)\{θ} are convex (Lemmata A.8
and 6), it follows that S1(θ) = [θ,max S1(θ)].
Lemma 6 shows that also S2(θ) \ {θ} is convex. Since minS1(θ) = θ, Lemma A.3 says
that when θ > 0 we have φ2(r2, θ) = 0 for all r2 ∈ (s(θ), θ), and thus max S2(θ)\{θ} ≤ s(θ)
for all θ ∈ (0, θ2). Suppose that max S2(θ) \ {θ} < s(θ). In this case, it must be that
φ1(r1, θ) = 0 for every r1 ∈ (θ, s(max S2(θ) \ {θ})), as for sender 1 every such a report r1
would be dominated by truthful reporting. This is in contradiction with Lemma A.8, and
therefore it must be that max S2(θ) \ {θ} = s(θ) for every θ ∈ (0, θ2). When θ = 0, we
have that max S2(0) = 0 (Lemma A.6).
Lemma 7 shows that φ2(r2, θ) is atomless in S2(θ)\{θ}. Therefore, for a r2 ∈ S2(θ)\{θ}
we have that Φ2(r2, θ) = Ψ2(r2, θ), and thus by using Proposition 2 we can write
Φ2(r2, θ)|r2∈S2(θ)\{θ}=
∫ r2
min S2(θ)
ψ2(r, θ)dr =
k1
u1(θ)
[C1(s(minS2(θ)), θ) − C1(s(r2), θ)] .
The probability that sender 2 misreports information in state θ ∈ (0, θ2) is thus
Φ2(s(θ), θ) =
k1
u1(θ)
C1(s(minS2(θ)), θ). (6)
Since minS2(θ) ≥ r
¯
2(θ) (Lemma A.2), it follows from Lemma 4 that, for every θ ∈ (0, θ2),
s(minS2(θ)) < r̄1(θ). Lemma A.7 shows that the set S2(θ) \ {θ} is not a singleton, and
since max S2(θ) \ {θ} ≤ s(θ) it must be that minS2(θ) < s(θ). Thus by Lemma 4 we have,
for θ ∈ (0, θ2), that s(minS2(θ)) ∈ (θ, r̄1(θ)). Finally, by definition of upper reach we get
that C1(r̄1(θ), θ) = u1(θ)/k1, and C1(r1, θ) < u1(θ)/k1 for every r1 ∈ [θ, r̄1(θ)). Therefore,
it follows that Φ2(s(θ), θ) ∈ (0, 1) for every θ ∈ (0, θ2). By using s(s(r)) = r and s(0) = 0
(Lemma 4), when θ = 0 we obtain that Φ2(s(0), 0) = 1 only if minS2(0) = r
¯
2(0).
The above argument shows that θ ∈ S2(θ) and that φ2(θ) has an atom in r2 = θ
of size α2(θ) = 1 − Φ2(s(θ), θ). Lemma 1 implies that every pair of on-path reports
(r1, r2) such that rj ≥ 0, j ∈ {1, 2}, must yield β(r1, r2) = +©. Therefore, by reporting
truthfully when θ ≥ 0, sender 2 obtains a payoff of W ω2 (θ, θ) = u2(θ). It must be that
max S1(θ) ≤ s(minS2(θ)), otherwise every report r1 > s(minS2(θ)) would be dominated
by s(minS2(θ)). Since φ1(θ) has no atom in s(minS2(θ)) > θ (Lemma 7), by reporting
r2 = minS2(θ) sender 2 (almost) always induces the selection of its preferred alternative
-©, and gets an expected payoff of W ω2 (minS2(θ), θ) = −k2C2(minS2(θ), θ).
In equilibrium each sender must receive the same expected payoff from delivering any
report that is in the support of its own strategy. Since by definition of lower reach we
obtain C2(r
¯
2(θ), θ) = −u2(θ)/k2, it follows that W
ω
2 (minS2(θ), θ) = u2(θ) = W
ω
2 (θ, θ) only
if minS2(θ) = r
¯
2(θ). Therefore, for a θ ∈ [0, θ2), we have that S2(θ) = [r
¯
2(θ), s(θ)]∪{θ}. It
also follows that max S1(θ) = s(r
¯
2(θ)): if max S1(θ) < s(r
¯
2(θ)), then r
¯
2(θ) < s(max S1(θ))
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and every r2 < s(max S1(θ)) would be strictly dominated by s(max S1(θ)). Thus, S1(θ) =
[θ, s(r
¯
2(θ))]. Similar arguments apply to the case θ ∈ (θ1, 0), completing the proof.
Proposition 4. In a direct equilibrium, for every state θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), strategies φj(θ) have
an atom at rj = θ of size αj(θ), where
α1(θ) =



k2
−u2(θ)
C2 (s(θ), θ) if θ ∈ [0, θ2)
1 − k2
−u2(θ)
C2 (s(r̄1(θ)), θ) if θ ∈ (θ1, 0],
α2(θ) =



1 − k1
u1(θ)
C1 (s(r
¯
2(θ)), θ) if θ ∈ [0, θ2)
k1
u1(θ)
C1 (s(θ), θ) if θ ∈ (θ1, 0].
Proof. Consider a direct equilibrium and a state θ ∈ [0, θ2). The proof of Proposition 3
shows that φ2(θ) has an atom in r2 = θ of size α2(θ) = 1 − Φ2(s(θ), θ). From equation (6)
and given minS2(θ) = r
¯
2(θ), we obtain that
α2(θ) = 1 −
k1
u1(θ)
C1(s(r
¯
2(θ)), θ).
By Lemma 7, sender 1’s strategy φ1(θ) admits an atom only in minS1(θ) = θ. Therefore,
we can use Proposition 2 to write
Φ1(r1, θ)|r1∈S1(θ) = α1(θ) +
∫ r1
θ
ψ1(r, θ)dr
= α1(θ) +
k2
−u2(θ)
[C2(s(r1), θ) − C2(s(θ), θ)] .
Since max S1(θ) = s(r
¯
2(θ)), it must be that Φ1(s(r
¯
2(θ)), θ) = 1. By using s(s(r
¯
2(θ))) =
r
¯
2(θ) (Lemma 4) and given that from the definition of lower reach we obtain C2(r
¯
2(θ), θ) =
−k2/u2(θ), we have
Φ1(s(r
¯
2(θ)), θ) = α1(θ) +
k2
−u2(θ)
[C2(s(s(r
¯
2(θ))), θ) − C2(s(θ), θ)]
= α1(θ) + 1 −
k2
−u2(θ)
C2(s(θ), θ) = 1,
from which we obtain that
α1(θ) =
k2
−u2(θ)
C2(s(θ), θ).
A similar procedure can be used for θ ∈ (θ1, 0), completing the proof.
Lemma A.9. In a direct equilibrium, for every (on-path) pair of reports (r1, r2) such that
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r2 = s(r1), posterior beliefs are
p(θ|r1, r2) > 0 if and only if θ ∈ [max{r2, r̄
−1
1 (r1)},min{r1, r¯
−1
2 (r2)}].
Proof. Consider a DE and a pair of reports (r1, r2) such that r̄1(0) ≥ r1 > 0 > r2 ≥ r
¯
2(0).
Given equilibrium supports in Proposition 3, all such pairs are on-path (e.g., for θ = 0).
Upon observing (r1, r2), the decision maker forms posterior beliefs p(θ|r1, r2). By Lemma 1,
it must be that p(θ|r1, r2) = 0 for every θ /∈ [r2, r1]. By Lemma 5, it must be that
p(θ|r1, r2) = 0 for every θ /∈ [θ1, θ2]. By Proposition 3 we have that minS2(θ) ≥ r
¯
2(θ) and
max S1(θ) ≤ r̄1(θ), and therefore p(θ|r1, r2) = 0 for every θ /∈
[
r̄−11 (r1), r
¯
−1
2 (r2)
]
, where
from equations (1) and (2) we obtain
r̄−11 (r1) = min {θ ∈ Θ|u1(θ) = k1C1(r1, θ)} ,
r
¯
−1
2 (r2) = max {θ ∈ Θ|−u2(θ) = k2C2(r2, θ)} .
From Proposition 3 we also have that, for every θ ∈ [0, θ2), max S1(θ) = s(r
¯
2(θ)) ≤ r1(θ).
Therefore, given the report r1 ∈ (0, r̄1(0)], it must be that p(θ|r1, r2) = 0 for all θ such
that s(r
¯
2(θ)) < r1. By Lemma 4 and since dr
¯
2(θ)/dθ > 0, there is a state θ
′ such that
s(r
¯
2(θ
′)) = r1. Denote such state with t1(r1) := {θ ∈ Θ|s(r
¯
2(θ)) = r1}, where t1(r1) > 0
and dt1(r1)/dr1 > 0. Similarly, denote t2(r2) := {θ ∈ Θ|s(r̄1(θ)) = r2}. Given equilibrium
supports, it must be that p(θ|r1, r2) = 0 for all θ /∈ [t2(r2), t1(r1)].
By Lemma 4 and since s(r
¯
2(θ2)) = θ2 (Definition 6), we obtain that t1(r1) ≤ θ2 for
every r1 ∈ [θ2, r̄1(0)], and thus min{r1, t1(r1)} ≤ θ2 for all r1 ∈ (0, r̄1(0)]. Similarly, we get
that max{r2, t2(r2)} ≥ θ1 for all r2 ∈ [r
¯
2(0), 0). Therefore, we have that p(θ|r1, r2) = 0
for every θ /∈ [max{r2, r̄
−1
1 (r1), t2(r2)},min{r1, r
¯
−1
2 (r2), t1(r1)}], and by Proposition 3 we
obtain that p(θ|r1, r2) ∝ f(θ) · φ1(r1, θ) · φ2(r2, θ) > 0 otherwise.
Consider now the case where r2 = s(r1) (or, by Lemma 4, r1 = s(r2)). By definition,
at state θ′ = t1(r1) we have s(r
¯
2(θ
′)) = r1. Thus, we get that s(r1) = r
¯
2(θ
′) = r2
and r
¯
−1
2 (r2) = θ
′ = t1(r1). Similarly, we obtain that r̄
−1
1 (r1) = t2(r2). Therefore,
for every pair of reports (r1, s(r1)) we have that p(θ|r1, s(r1)) > 0 if and only if θ ∈
[
max
{
r2, r̄
−1
1 (r1)
}
,min
{
r1, r
¯
−1
2 (r2)
}]
.
Proposition 5. In a direct equilibrium, the swing report function s(ri) is implicitly defined
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and ri ∈ R̂, as
s(ri) =
{
rj ∈ Rj
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ min{r1,r
¯
−1
2
(r2)}
max{r2,r̄−11 (r1)}
f(θ)
udm(θ)
u1(θ)u2(θ)
dCj(rj, θ)
drj
dCi(ri, θ)
dri
dθ = 0
}
. (4)
Proof. Given the equilibrium reporting strategies φj(rj|θ) = δ(rj − θ)αj(θ) + ψj(rj|θ),
j ∈ {1, 2} (Propositions 2, 3, and 4), the mixed probability distribution p(r1, r2|θ) =
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φ1(r1, θ)φ2(r2, θ) is
p(r1, r2|θ) = δ(r1 − θ)δ(r2 − θ)α1(θ)α2(θ) + δ(r1 − θ)α1(θ)ψ2(r2, θ)
+ δ(r2 − θ)ψ1(r1, θ)α2(θ) + ψ1(r1, θ)ψ2(r2, θ).
Consider a pair of reports (r1, r2) such that r̄1(0) ≥ r1 > 0 > r2 ≥ r
¯
2(0) and r2 = s(r1)
(as by Lemma 4 we have that if r > 0, then s(r) < 0). Since dCj(rj ,θ)
drj
∣
∣
∣
rj=θ
= 0 for
every θ ∈ Θ, we obtain that ψj(s(θ), θ) = 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and therefore
p(r1, s(r1)|θ) = ψ1(r1, θ)ψ2(s(r1), θ).
The swing report s(r1) is defined in Definition 5 as the r2 ∈ R2 such that Udm(r1, r2) =
∫
Θ udm(θ)p(θ|r1, r2)dθ = 0, and by Lemma 4 we know that s(r1) ∈ [r¯
2(0), 0). By
Lemma A.9 we have that p(θ|r1, s(r1)) > 0 if and only if θ ∈ [max{r2, r̄
−1
1 (r1)},min{r1, r
¯
−1
2 (r2)}],
and therefore by using Bayes’ rule we can rewrite the condition Udm(r1, s(r1)) = 0 as
Gs(r1, s(r1)) = 0, where
Gs(r1, r2) =
1
p(r1, r2)
∫ min{r1,r
¯
−1
2
(r2)}
max{r2,r̄−11 (r1)}
udm(θ)f(θ)ψ1(r1, θ)ψ2(r2, θ)dθ.
By substituting for the equilibrium strategies ψj(rj, θ) as described in Proposition 2, we
obtain the implicit definition of the swing report given in equation (4).
Corollary 1. Direct equilibria are essentially unique.
Proof. The solution of equation (4) is unique and depends only on the model’s primitives
udm(θ), f(θ), ui(θ), τi, ki, Ci(ri, θ), for i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, for every r ∈ [r
¯
2(0), r̄1(0)],
the swing report s(r) is the same across every DE. It follows that the truthful cutoffs θ1
and θ2, and the senders’ reporting strategies φj(θ) and supports Sj(θ), j ∈ {1, 2}, are also
the same in all DE. Thus, all DE are strategy and outcome equivalent.
Lemma A.10. There exists direct equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs.
Proof. Consider a DE and an off-path pair reports (r1, r2). By Propositions 2, 3, and 4,
and by Lemma 5, we obtain that the only pair of reports such that φj(rj, θ) = 0 for all
θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ {1, 2} is (0, 0). For every other off-path pair of reports, there is always a
sender i such that φi(ri, θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ. There are three types of off-path pairs of
reports that need to be considered: those that violate Lemma 1, such as when r1 > r2;
those that violate Proposition 3, such as when r1 > s(r
¯
2(r2)); those that violate Lemma 5,
such as when r1 6= r2 for some (r1, r2) /∈ (θ1, θ2)
2.
For beliefs to be unprejudiced, Definition 7 requires that for every such off-path pair
of reports we have that p(θ′′|r1, r2) > 0 if and only if there is a sender i ∈ {1, 2} such that
φi(ri, θ
′′) > 0. Since p(θ′′|r1, r2) can be arbitrarily small, I can just focus on beliefs that
rationalize deviations as originating from only one sender. Hereafter, I will consider some
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posterior beliefs p′ which, given an off-path pair of reports (r1, r2), rationalize deviations as
originating with certainty from one specific sender i under the constraint that φj(rj, θ) > 0
for some θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ {1, 2}. If there is a DE with such beliefs p′, then there exists a
DE with beliefs p′′ (e.g., a small perturbation of p′) that satisfy Definition 7 (and thus
also Definition 2).
First, if 0 ≤ r1 < r2 (resp. r1 < r2 ≤ 0), then set p
′ such that the decision maker
believes the deviation has been performed by sender 1 (2). Given the equilibrium strategies,
it must be that sender 2 (1) is reporting truthfully, and thus p′ leads to β(r1, r2) = +©
( -©). Consider now the case r1 < 0 < r2, and set p
′ such that the decision maker believes
that only sender 1 (or 2) is deviating. Therefore, it must be that sender 2 (1) is reporting
truthfully, and thus β(r1, r2) = +© ( -©). Second, consider an off-path pair of reports such
that, for an x ≥ 0, r2 > x and r1 ≥ s(r
¯
2(x)) (resp. r1 < y ≤ 0 and r2 ≤ s(r̄1(y))). If
through p′ the decision maker believes that sender 1 (2) is the deviator, then it must
be that θ = r2 (θ = r1) and therefore β(r1, r2) = +© ( -©). Finally, consider an off-path
pair (r1, r2) /∈ (θ1, θ2)
2 with r1 6= r2. If both r1, r2 ≥ θ2 (resp. r1, r2 ≤ θ1), then, by
rationalizing the deviation as originating from one sender, the decision maker would infer
that θ ≥ θ2 > 0 (θ ≤ θ1 < 0) and select β(r1, r2) = +© ( -©).
Since p′ is consistent with conditions (C) and (D), and since given p′ no sender has
individual profitable deviations from the prescribed equilibrium strategies, it follows that
there are DE with unprejudiced beliefs as defined in Definition 2 and 7.
Corollary 2. There are direct equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs that are also ε-robust.
Proof. Consider an ε-perturbed game with sequence εn and full support distributions
Ĝ = (Ĝ1, Ĝ2) such that ĝ1(r1) ≈ 0 for all r1 < 0 and ĝ2(r2) ≈ 0 for all r2 > 0. This means
that it is relatively unlikely that the report of sender 1 (resp. 2) is by mistake observed
to be negative (resp. positive). By equation (5), the limit beliefs p̂0+ induced by the
strategies of a DE after observing a pair of reports (r1, r2) such that 0 ≤ r1 < r2 are
p̂0+(θ|r1 ≥ 0, r2 > 0) ≈ f(θ)
δ(r2 − θ)α2(θ)
f(r2)α2(r2)
.
Therefore, the CDF P̂0+ =
∫
p0+(θ|r1, r2)dθ is such that
P̂0+(θ|r1 ≥ 0, r2 > 0) ≈



0 if θ < r2
1 if θ ≥ r2.
As εn → 0+ and for every off-path pair of reports that are both positive, the decision
maker is almost sure that the realized state coincides with the report of sender 2. Similarly,
we obtain that P̂0+(r1 < 0, r2 ≤ 0) ≈ 0 for all θ < r1 and ≈ 1 otherwise, and by Lemma 3,
we have that p̂0+(θ|r1 < 0, r2 > 0) > 0 only for θ ∈ {r1, r2}. Therefore, limit beliefs p̂0+
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are arbitrarily close to the posterior beliefs p′ in the proof of Lemma A.10, and therefore
can support a DE. Since a DE is also a PBE, by Lemma 3 we obtain that there exists
direct equilibria with unprejudiced beliefs that are also ε-robust.
Corollary 3. A direct equilibrium always exists.
Proof. Given strategies φj(rj, θ) = δ(rj − θ)αj(θ) + ψj(rj, θ) as in Proposition 2 and 4,
with support Sj(θ) as in Proposition 3, posterior beliefs p(θ|r1, r2) are such that the swing
report function s(r) is as in Proposition 5. Given s(r), strategies φj(rj, θ) are optimal by
construction, and thus no sender j ∈ {1, 2} can perform a profitable individual deviation
from φj(rj, θ). Therefore, for every primitive of the model that satisfies the conditions
outlined in Section 3, there must exist a direct equilibrium as defined by Definition 4.
A.3 Example: Symmetric Environments
Corollary 4. In a direct equilibrium of a symmetric environment, s(r) = −r for every
r ∈ R̂.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 5: consider a symmetric environment
and suppose that s(r) = −r. Given a report r ∈ (0, r̄1(0)), the interval of integration
in (4) has max{−r, r̄−11 (r)} = − min{r, r
¯
−1
2 (−r)}. Since the integrand in (4) is symmetric
around zero, we obtain that Gs(r,−r) = 0, confirming that indeed s(r) = −r.
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